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Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy

DIRECTORY OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES

Prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat

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INTRODUCTION

1. At its meeting held from 25 to 29 September 2000, the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices requested the UNCTAD secretariat to continue to publish an updated version of the Directory of Competition Authorities (Resolution para. 12 (b) in document TD/RBP/CONF. 5/15)

2. Accordingly, the present document contains a revised version of the Directory of Competition Authorities, which could be used to facilitate contacts between officials responsible for the control of restrictive business practices in the performance of their duties.

3. Should national competition authorities wish to further update information contained in this document, the UNCTAD secretariat would be grateful if they would provide their full names, addresses, telephone and fax numbers, electronic mail address and Web site.

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Commission on Investment, Technology and
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Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy
Third session
Geneva, 2 July 2001
Item 2 of the provisional agenda

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Provisional agenda and annotations

I. PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1. Election of officers
2. Adoption of the agenda and organization of work
3. (i) Consultations on competition law and policy, including the Model Law and studies related to the provisions of the Set of Principles and Rules
   (ii) Work programme, including technical assistance, advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy
4. Provisional agenda for the fourth session
5. Adoption of the report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts

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II. ANNOTATIONS

Item 1. Election of officers

The Intergovernmental Group of Experts will elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman-cum-Rapporteur.

Item 2. Adoption of the agenda and organization of work

The Expert Meeting may wish to adopt the provisional agenda, which is the same as those for previous sessions of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts, and which have always been found suitable for the effective discharge of the Group's duties.

Organization of work

It is proposed that the first plenary meeting, which will open at 10 a.m. on Monday 2 July 2001, be devoted to procedural matters (items 1 and 2 of the provisional agenda) and to introductory statements. The closing plenary meeting, on 4 July, will be devoted to the adoption of the report (item 4). 1/

This will leave the remaining meetings, from the afternoon of 2 July to the morning of 4 July inclusive, for consultations on competition law and policy, including studies related to the provisions of the Set of Principles and Rules (item 3 (i) of the provisional agenda) and the work programme, including technical assistance, advisory and training programme on competition law and policy (item 3 (ii)). If more time is needed, the adoption of the report could be postponed to late afternoon of 4 July, in order for an informal working session to take place that afternoon.

Item 3 (i). Consultations on competition law and policy, including the Model Law and studies related to the provisions of the Set of Principles and Rules

As agreed in paragraph 8 of the Resolution adopted by the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review all Aspects of the Set, 2/ at its third session the Intergovernmental Group of Experts will consider the following issues, for better implementation of the Set, in relation to the studies prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat:

(a) Cooperation regarding merger control;
(b) The interface between competition policy and intellectual property rights.

Under paragraph 6 of that Resolution, the Fourth Review Conference also noted that "while bilateral competition cooperation efforts are essential, there is need to promote regional as well as multilateral competition initiatives, particularly for smaller and developing economies", and requested "the UNCTAD secretariat to study the possibility of formulating a model cooperation agreement on competition law and policy, based on the UN Set of Principles and Rules on Competition". In line with this request, and given the interest expressed by many delegations in the issue of international

cooperation, a third issue for consideration will be "cooperation and technical assistance in the field of competition law and policy". Should countries wish to hold consultations on additional subjects, they are requested to inform the secretariat well in advance (no later than 15 May 2001) in order for all participants to be able to prepare themselves for such consultations. Moreover, for each of the issues referred to above, the secretariat would encourage experts from both developed and developing countries, as well as countries in transition, to make oral presentations supported by short written contributions to be made available during the consultations.

Further, under paragraph 7 of the same resolution, the Review Conference requested the secretariat to revise documents TD/RBP/CONF.5/4, TD/RBP/CONF.5/5, TD/RBP/CONF.5/6, and TD/RBP/CONF.5/7 in the light of comments by member States at the Conference or to be sent in writing by 31 January 2001 for submission to the next session of the Group of Experts and to make them available through UNCTAD's website. Also, in paragraph 11 of the Resolution, the Review Conference requested the secretariat to prepare for the 2001 session of the Group of Experts a new chapter of the model law on "The relationships between a competition authority and regulatory bodies, including sectoral regulators".

Accordingly, the revised versions of document TD/RBP/CONF.5/4, on "Experiences gained so far with international cooperation on competition policy issues and the mechanisms used"; TD/RBP/CONF.5/6, on "Competition policy and the exercise of intellectual property rights", and the new chapter of the model law will be made available for consideration by the experts in documents TD/B/COM.2/CLP/21, TD/B/COM.2/CLP/22 and TD/B/COM.2/CLP/23 respectively. An updated review of technical assistance (replacing TD/RBP/CONF.5/5) will be submitted under agenda sub-item 3(ii), below.

Finally, as requested under paragraph 12 of the Resolution, the secretariat continued to publish the following documents on a regular basis and to make them available on the Internet:

(a) A further issue of the Handbook on Competition Legislation containing the laws and commentaries from: Georgia, Morocco and Ukraine (published as document TD/B/COM.2/CLP/17);

(b) An updated version of the Directory of Competition Authorities (published as TD/B/COM.2/CLP/18); and,

(c) An information note on recent important competition cases, with special reference to cases involving more than one country, being published separately as document TD/B/COM.2/CLP/24.

These three documents, being non-sessional as far as the Intergovernmental Group of Experts is concerned, might not all be available in due time for the session, but will be included in the UNCTAD website (http://www/unctad.org/competition) as soon as they have been issued.

Item 3 (ii) Work programme, including technical assistance, advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy

Under this item, the Intergovernmental Group of Experts is expected to give guidance to the UNCTAD secretariat as to further work to be undertaken on competition law and policy.

In particular, the experts will have before them an updated review of technical assistance, (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/19), taking into account the information submitted by States and international organizations, as requested in paragraph 7 of the Resolution adopted by the Review Conference. In paragraph 13 of that Resolution, the Review Conference also took note with appreciation of the new UNCTAD Competition Law and Policy website, and requested that forecasted events, such as seminars and other assistance, be indicated as far as possible in advance, to allow member States to be informed and to be in a position to participate in the technical assistance activities organized or sponsored by UNCTAD. The secretariat has done its best to comply with this request in its new Competition and Consumer Policies website at http://www.unctad.org/competition.

On the basis of the review of technical cooperation, the experts will be invited to give guidance to the secretariat on how best to assist developing countries in formulating national competition legislation and regional competition rules, as well as how best to identify financial and technical resources for their implementation.

Item 4. Provisional agenda for the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts

As is customary, the Intergovernmental Group of Experts is expected to agree on the provisional agenda for its next session.

Item 5. Adoption of the report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts

The Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy is required to report to the Commission on Investment, Technology and Related Financial Issues.

Note

1/ In view of the short duration of the session, the Rapporteur would be authorized to complete the final report after the close of the session.

2/ See Report of the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review all Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (TD/RBP/CONF.5/16), chapter I, page 4.

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TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD
Commission on Investment, Technology and
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Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy
Geneva, 2-4 July 2001
Item 3 (ii) of the provisional agenda

REVIEW OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ADVISORY AND TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

Note by the UNCTAD secretariat

Executive summary

UNCTAD provides various types of assistance and advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy to developing countries and countries in transition in accordance with requests received, the needs of the countries concerned and resources available. Accordingly, this note contains a progress report on the technical cooperation activities of the UNCTAD secretariat, which are described under three main subheadings, namely national activities, regional and subregional activities, and participation in seminars and conferences. In addition, it contains extracts from replies of member States and international organizations to the note by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD requesting information on technical cooperation activities in the field of competition law and policy. Also included are extracts from the replies received, which are related to requests for technical assistance with identification of specific competition law and policy areas or issues which the States would wish to see receive priority attention.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. It is recalled that the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, adopted by the General Assembly in 1980 (General Assembly resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980 - TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2), calls in Section F, paragraphs 6 and 7, for technical assistance, advisory and training programmes on restrictive business practices, particularly for developing countries. In line with the Set, the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set, in paragraph 14 of its resolution (TD/RBP/CONF. 5/16), took note with appreciation of the voluntary financial and other contributions for capacity building and technical cooperation, and invited all member States to assist UNCTAD on a voluntary basis in its technical cooperation by providing experts, training facilities and resources; requested the UNCTAD secretariat to continue and, resources permitting, to expand its technical cooperation activities; and invited the Secretary-General of UNCTAD to explore the feasibility of mobilizing financial and human resources on a more predictable and regular basis and to address the cooperation needs of developing countries and economies in transition in relevant official languages of the United Nations. It further requested the UNCTAD secretariat to prepare for submission to the next session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy a review of technical assistance, advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy, revised in the light of comments submitted by member States.

2. Accordingly, this note contains a progress report on the technical cooperation activities of the UNCTAD secretariat in the period immediately preceding and following the Fourth Review Conference, held from 25 to 29 September 2000, as well as extracts from replies of member States and international organizations to the note by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD requesting information on technical cooperation activities in the field of competition law and policy (TDN 915 (1) of 13 November 2000). The Secretary-General is grateful for the replies to his note.

II. PROGRESS REPORT ON UNCTAD TECHNICAL COOPERATION

3. UNCTAD provides assistance and advisory and training programmes on competition law and policy to developing countries and countries in transition in accordance with requests received, the needs of the countries concerned and resources available. The main types of the secretariat's technical cooperation activities are as follows:

(a) Provision of information about restrictive business practices (RBPs), their existence and possible adverse effects on the economy. This may involve a study of restrictive business practices in a specific country;

(b) Introductory seminars directed at a wide audience, including government officials and academics, as well as business and consumer-oriented circles;

(c) Assistance to States which are in the process of drafting competition legislation in the form of provision of information on such legislation in other countries or advice as to the drafting of their competition legislation;

(d) Advisory services for the setting up of a competition authority. This usually includes training of officials responsible for the actual control of RBPs and may involve training workshops and/or on-the-job training with competition authorities in countries that have experience in the field of competition;

(e) Organization of seminars for States which have already adopted competition legislation, have experience in the control of RBPs and wish to consult each other on specific cases and exchange information;

(f) Assistance to States which wish to revise their competition legislation and seek expert advice from competition authorities in other States, so as to amend their laws in the most effective manner possible.

4. The main technical cooperation activities of the UNCTAD secretariat for the above-mentioned period are described below.

A. National activities

5. Technical assistance related to preparation, drafting or revision of national competition legislation was provided to Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Thailand and Viet Nam. In particular, in the case of Mauritius, discussions were held between UNCTAD officials and representatives of the Government of Mauritius and of the private sector relating to a draft competition bill, prepared earlier in consultation with UNCTAD. In parallel with the work on elaborating a common approach to competition policy for the member States of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), individual member States were assisted in introducing procedures for the enforcement of national competition legislation compatible with the COMESA common competition policy. In addition, UNCTAD has exchanged experiences with the Italian Antitrust Authority with a view of transmitting them to countries beneficiaries of UNCTAD's technical assistance.

6. A national seminar on the implementation of the Zambian Competition Act was organized in July 2000 in Livingstone, Zambia. At the seminar, which followed a similar one held in 1999 in Lusaka, the progress being made in the implementation of competition policy in Zambia was reviewed and competition experts from the COMESA and Southern African Developed Community (SADC) regions of Africa were able to share their experiences.

7. A national seminar on competition law and policy was held by UNCTAD in cooperation with the Government of Cuba in Havana in February 2001 with participation of representatives of various Cuban Ministries, Chambers of Commerce, enterprises, research institutes and universities. It was the first step to furthering assistance to Cuba in the area of competition policy, as envisaged under a special UNCTAD project aimed at strengthening the capacity of Cuban public institutions to foster Cuban economic growth and the country's insertion into the world economy.

8. A training course, held in October-November 2000 in Bamako, Mali, acquainted a wide range of participants from Mali and neighbouring countries with specific problems of implementing competition policy, considered in the training manual developed by UNCTAD, and made it possible to initiate the building of local training capacity in the area of competition law and policy.

9. A seminar on "Safeguarding competition in a market economy" was held in October 2000 in Hanoi, Viet Nam. This seminar, sponsored by the German Foundation for International Economic Development (DSE) in cooperation with UNCTAD and organized within the framework of assistance to the Vietnamese Government in adopting national competition legislation, reviewed all major competition issues and considered various aspects of UNCTAD's new Model Law on Competition.

B. Regional and subregional activities

10. Following a Regional Seminar on Competition Policy for the Asia-Pacific Region held in India in April 2000, another Regional Seminar on Competition Law and Policy was held on 18 and 19 July 2000 in Casablanca by UNCTAD in partnership with the Ministry of General Affairs of the Government of Morocco. Also, an African Regional Seminar on Competition Law and Policy for COMESA and SADC member States was co-organized by UNCTAD and the Zambia Competition Commission on 24 and 25 July 2000 in Livingstone, Zambia. Both seminars adopted Declarations, containing a number of substantive proposals which were submitted and further discussed at the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set (Geneva, 25-29 September 2000).

11. UNCTAD also discussed with the Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) various problems related to the application of the common competition legislation in the UEMOA area.

12. In Latin America, a Regional Seminar on Competition Law and Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean was held from 30 August to1 September 2000 in San José, Costa Rica, by UNCTAD in cooperation with the Commission for the Promotion of Competition of Costa Rica and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The seminar contributed to the exchange of information and experiences by competition authorities of countries that have experience in the competition field with representatives of countries that still do not have a competition law or authority. It also allowed participants to update their knowledge of the international developments in competition policy, acted as a regional preparatory body for the Fourth Review Conference and agreed on the San José Declaration.

13. In cooperation with the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine and the European Commission, UNCTAD organized the Regional Conference on Competition for countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, held in Kiev, Ukraine, on 13 and 14 July 2000. The conference made possible a high-level and productive exchange of experiences and views on the problems of cooperation among and with countries of the region. It also reviewed various issues related to competition legislation and policy and individual country developments, and elaborated recommendations for the Fourth Review Conference, contained in the Kiev Declaration.

C. Participation in seminars and conferences

14. During the period under review, staff members of UNCTAD took part in a number of seminars, workshops and conferences related to issues of competition law and policy and consumer protection. In particular, resource persons from UNCTAD made substantive presentations and/or participated in discussions at the following meetings:

(a) The Round Table Forum on Competition Policy and Law: Their Role in Pro-poor Development, organized by the Department for International Development (London, July 2000);

(b) The Regional Workshop on Competition Policy, Economic Development and the Multilateral Trading System, held by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Phuket, Thailand, in July 2000;

(c) The IIIrd International Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the Antimonopoly Bodies of the Russian Federation and the 12th Meeting of the CIS Antimonopoly Committee, held in Moscow in October 2000;

(d) The Second International Cartels Workshop, organized by the Office of Fair Trading in Brighton, United Kingdom, in November 2000;

(e) The Launching Meeting for the "7-Up" Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) project on the comparative study of competition regimes in selected developing countries of the Commonwealth (Jaipur, India, December 2000);

(f) The Third International Meeting of Economists on Globalization and Development Problems, organized by the National Association of Economists of Latin America and Caribbean and the Cuban National Association of Economists and Accountants in Havana in January 2001.

III. TECHNICAL COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A. Technical assistance provided, planned or received

15. Below are extracts from the replies received to the Secretary-General's note TDN 915 (1) of 13 November 2000, which requested information on technical cooperation activities in the field of competition law and policy.

Barbados

16. A representative of Barbados attended a workshop on Competition Law and Policy, organized by UNCTAD and held in Trinidad and Tobago in 1999.

China

17. In 1999, the Chinese competition authority – the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) – carried out joint cooperation activities on competition and consumer protection with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Experts from the ACCC twice participated in seminars in China on competition legislation and law enforcement, regulation of natural monopolies, and exemptions from competition law and consumer protection. In addition, the SAIC sent a delegation to make a study tour regarding Australian competition legislation and law enforcement by the ACCC. In 1999 and 2000 the SAIC carried out joint cooperation activities with the General Directorate for Fair Trading, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) of France. It invited five experts from the DGCCRF to lecture in two training courses in China with the participation of some 120 officials from the Chinese competition authority. Also, the SAIC sent a delegation to study the situation in France. Since 1997, it has sent delegates to participate in the workshops on competition co-sponsored by the Korean Fair Trade Commission and relevant organizations such as the Organisation on Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Korean Development Institute. These workshops have provided opportunities for officials from developing countries to extend their knowledge of competition laws/policies and to share their enforcement experiences. Since 1998, the SAIC has each year sent its officials to participate in training courses funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and organized by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. The main subject of these courses is competition law and policies, consumer protection and the situation of law enforcement in Japan. Since 1998, the OECD has been providing technical assistance in the area of anti-monopoly legislation in China. In 1998 and 1999, the OECD and the Chinese drafting group on anti-monopoly law co-organized two international seminars on anti-monopoly legislation. In 1999, the OECD invited the drafting group to attend the meeting of the Competition Law and Policy Committee as an observer, and also arranged a symposium for the drafting group.

Fiji

18. In October 2000, the Government appointed members to the Commerce Commission, which is an independent statutory body established under the Commerce Act of 1998 and is responsible for the regulation of competition, consumer protection and pricing through all sectors of the economy. The newly established Commission is currently liaising with the New Zealand Commerce Commission for technical assistance since its structure mirrors that of the New Zealand Commerce Commission.

Ghana

19. Ghana has benefited from the following technical cooperation activities: (a) UNCTAD's technical assistance in providing resource persons for a National Seminar on Competition Policy and Law in 1992; (b) fact finding mission to the UNCTAD secretariat in Geneva and United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading in London, and discussions with consultants provided by the UNCTAD secretariat within the framework of technical assistance in the drafting of the Competition Bill; and (c) technical assistance provided by UNCTAD through an attachment course to the German Federal Cartel Office.

Italy

20. All national technical assistance activities in the field of competition policy have been carried out exclusively by the Competition Authority. In 1999 and 2000, the Authority provided assistance through various formats (internships, seminars, submission of written comments on draft laws, etc.). The most common forms of assistance have been: (a) the organization of internships for foreign officials (from Kenya in 1999 and from Mozambique in 2000); and (b) the contribution by Authority experts to training seminars (in Budapest, Sofia, Mexico City and Vilnius in 1999, and in Rome and Casablanca in 2000). Recently, the Authority joined with the German Ministry of Finance in two-year European Union (EU) twinning project with Romania in the field of competition and State aid policy to facilitate that country's accession to the EU. Preparatory work for an assistance project with the Competition Authority of the Russian Federation has also started. All technical assistance activities have been of a short-term nature, while the planned project with Romania will involve for the first time in the recipient country a medium-term detachment of Authority officials.

21. As far as the geographical coverage of technical assistance activities is concerned, no explicit priorities have been set, as long as such activities are demand-driven. It should be noted, however, that technical assistance requests addressed to the Authority often come through other international organizations (EU, OECD, UNCTAD, WTO, World Bank) and the funding relates only to the covering of the direct expenses of the Authority. No human resources are specifically allocated for technical assistance activities: these are carried out on a rotation basis. The skills which have proved to be highly desirable for officials assigned to take part in these activities include a solid economic and legal background coupled with several years of antitrust enforcement experience.

Lithuania

22. During 2000, further attempts were made to give practical effect to technical assistance received by the Competition Council from international organizations. In 2000 technical assistance was provided to the Competition Council through the PHARE SEIL project (Support to European Integration in Lithuania). The basic objective pursued during implementation of the project was assistance in drafting legal acts related to the adoption of the new Lithuanian Law on Competition. Since 1999 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided bilateral assistance to the Competition Council under the FEU Programme, which supports the process of transposing EU legislation into national legislation, namely by granting bloc exemptions to vertical restraints and for different transport sectors. Measures were also taken for the implementation of the PHARE Twinning Technical Assistance Project "Strengthening and Enforcement of Competition Policy", which started at the end of 2000. The main objective of the project is to support Lithuania's enforcement of a transparent competition policy, so that by the end of the project compatibility with EU requirement is achieved. In particular, this requires the further strengthening of the enforcement, monitoring and reporting capacities of the Competition Council in the area of State aid. The project includes drafting of secondary legislation in the field of antitrust and State aid, extensive staff training and education of key targeted audiences in the public sector, assistance in investigating individual cases and strengthening the institutional capacity of the Competition Council.

Madagascar

23. The 1997 agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and UNCTAD on the technical cooperation and assistance programme for competition policy covered: (a) the holding in Madagascar of a national two-day seminar for government officials and local business and consumer representatives on the implications of new legislation in the light of Madagascar's commitments under its liberalization policy (the legislation referred to is bill No. 97-025, on competition and consumer protection, which never became law); (b) the fullest possible documentation on the provisions in force in other countries in the area of competition and trade, including dumping, consumer protection, unfair competition, price control and businesses, as well as the provision of a grant for Malagasy managers to attend a short course on competition law; (c) the organization at the above-mentioned seminar of training sessions for trainers, aimed at the officials actually employed to control restrictive business practices, which was attended by around 20 people, including representatives of the private sector; (d) technical assistance as needed for the drafting of competition-related legislation and the associated implementing regulations, including those for the competition law.

24. A seminar on competition policy in Madagascar at the dawn of the new millennium was jointly organized by UNCTAD and the Government of Madagascar and held in Antananarivo in December 1999.

Peru

25. The third internship programme in the National Institute for the Defence of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) for government officials is planned for the second half of 2001. Its aim is to boost competition and intellectual property protection in American countries by disseminating the methods applied by INDECOPI in its various fields of activity.

26. Between 1998 and 2000, the competition-policy projects and activities carried out in Peru with the help of international cooperation included: (a) an international seminar on competition policy organized jointly with the Organization of American States in 1998; (b) a project to strengthen the regulation and promotion of the market economy carried out in cooperation with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Andean Development Corporation between 1998 and 2000; and (c) an international workshop on competition policy organized jointly with OECD in 1999. INDECOPI officials attended: (a) a course on competition policy funded by the World Bank and IDB and held in Washington in 1998; (b) a competition policy course funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 1999; (c) a course on competition policy and anti-monopoly activities funded by JICA and held in Osaka in 1999; (d) a course on the economics of regulating public services, funded by IDB and held in Buenos Aires in 2000; and (e) the fourth Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Partners for Progress (PFP) course on competition policy for APEC member economies, funded by the Thai Department of International Trade, the United States Fair Trade Commission and JICA.

Poland

27. The principal institution responsible for technical assistance in the field of competition law and policy in Poland is the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP), which was established in 1990. In recent years, the Office has benefited from technical assistance by the European Union within the framework of PHARE programmes. This assistance has consisted mainly of training of experts on competition law and policy issues, study visits to the appropriate European institutions responsible for anti-monopoly policy, secondments to the Directorate General on Competition in the European Commission and the preparation of reports. In the early 1990s, the Office received assistance from the United States.

Romania

28. In 2000, the Romanian Competition Council (RCC) benefited from three technical cooperation activities. First, technical assistance provided by the United States through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the form of a technical assistance programme with two components: (a) long-term assistance by a special adviser from the United States Federal Trade Commission who was appointed to the RCC; and (b) short-term assistance, such as one-week missions. The long-term mission ended in April 2000, but within the framework of the technical assistance programme provided by the United States Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, a workshop on real competition cases was organized in collaboration with experts from both agencies in June 2000, when the programme officially terminated. At the end of 2000, several meetings were held with the representatives of the United States Federal Trade Commission to discuss the resumption of the programme which was provided for the RCC and the Competition Office. Within its framework, a medium-term mission was envisaged to take place in February 2001 and a special adviser from the United States Federal Trade Commission was appointed to the RCC.

29. Second, in accordance with the provisions of the European Association Agreement EU-Romania, the RCC was involved in the pre-accession programme and in the harmonization of Romanian competition legislation. Under the Association Agreement, it also focused on institution building, effective enforcement of competition policy and especially on the training of Council staff, which was one of the most important items. Within the 1999 PHARE budget, a project to strengthen administrative capacity in the field of competition and State aid was approved. Both the Competition Council and the Competition Office will benefit from this project, which consists of two components: (a) training sessions with the competition authorities of EU member States, exchange of experience and seminars organized in Romania with lectures by EU specialists; and (b) assistance provided by an EU expert to the RCC in the area of adoption of secondary legislation and enforcement of State aid legislation. In addition, the RCC received assistance from the EU Commission in the form of a seminar on liberalization of public utilities and State aid issues, which was held in Rome in March 2000. Also in 2000, under PHARE auspices, the European Institute in Bucharest organized a series of seminars on competition and State aid issues.

30. Third, within the OECD's multilateral assistance programme for Central and Eastern Europe countries, experts from the RCC attended a two-week seminar in Vienna, which focused on sharing experiences acquired in dealing with various cases.

Thailand

31. The Department of Internal Trade (DIP) has received technical assistance from the World Bank with regard to the drafting and implementation of Thailand's competition law - the Business Competition Act of 1999. The next phase of the World Bank's assistance will concentrate on educating civil society about competition issues, developing enforcement capacity through the dissemination of information relating to specific cases and government policies, and organizing training and workshops. The targeted groups will consist of consumers, business associations, legal/economic professional communities and governmental organizations.

Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)

32. The Secretary-General of ALADI broached the subject of competition law and policy and technical assistance information for the first time in 1998 with the publication of the information paper "Politicas de competencia y consumidores" ("Competition policy and consumers") (ALADI/SEC/di 1168, of 16 November 1998). The paper gives an overview of this kind of policy in relation to consumer protection, as well as of the provisions in force in the countries of ALADI, the Andean Community, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the G-3, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), etc. At the same time, a description is provided of the practices that distort competition, namely: horizontal and/or vertical agreements; collective decisions and concerted practices that have the objective or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting free competition; abuse of dominant position; regulating the system of State aid; and other practices that are contrary to the normal and correct functioning of competition, producing distortion in internal markets (oligopolies, monopolies, etc.). A comparative analysis was also made of the measures taken by MERCOSUR and the applicable Andean Community decisions. Subsequently, documents ALADI/SEC/di 1245 and 1400 were issued; they describe the activities carried out to implement the provisions of the ALADI programme of activities in this field during 1997, 1998 and 1999 in the main forums and under various schemes, and consider the situation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), FTAA, the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, the Economic Complementarity Agreements (ACE-ALADI), etc.

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

33. Between 1999 and 2000, the main technical cooperation activities undertaken in the area of competition policy included the following: (a) ECLAC cooperated with the Government of Nicaragua in attending the International Conference on Competition Policy and Its Institutions, organized by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and held in Managua in November 1999; (b) ECLAC helped organize, together with the regional organization Consumers International, an international seminar on competition law in Latin America, held in September 1999 in Santiago, Chile; and (c) ECLAC helped organize, together with UNCTAD and the Costa Rican Commission for the Promotion of Competition, a regional seminar on competition law and policy for Latin America and the Caribbean, held from 30 August to 1 September 2000 in San José, Costa Rica. The San José Declaration, which was drafted at this meeting, was submitted by UNCTAD to the

Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices; (d) ECLAC provided technical assistance to the Negotiating Group on Competition Policy with a view to setting up FTAA. This work took the form of participation in the OAS-IDB-ECLAC Tripartite Committee. This technical cooperation work, which involves most of the countries in the hemisphere, has been carried out continuously since the first meeting of the Negotiating Group in September 1998.

World Trade Organization

34. Paragraph 22 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration provides that the technical cooperation programme of the WTO secretariat shall be made available to developing and, in particular, least-developed country members to facilitate their participation in the work of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) which is established in paragraph 20 of the Declaration. During 2000, the secretariat has sought to respond to a request by developing countries during the preparatory process for the Seattle Ministerial Conference for additional and more intensive assistance in the area of trade and competition policy, particularly through regional workshops and similar activities. A number of activities were undertaken in that connection. In several cases, these activities were organized by the WTO with the participation of staff from other intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD and the OECD, or staff of the WTO secretariat participating in activities organized by other intergovernmental organizations.

35. In July 2000, a WTO Regional Workshop on Competition Policy, Economic Development and the Multilateral Trading System was held in Phuket, Thailand, for the benefit of Asian WTO members and observers. It was organized by the WTO secretariat in cooperation with the Government of Thailand and with financial support from the Government of Japan. It was attended by representatives of 22 WTO member and observer countries from South, South East and East Asia, from both trade ministries and competition offices. The workshop examined a range of questions relating to the role of competition policy in developing economies, the needs of the latter with respect to technical assistance and other forms of cooperation, and the role that the multilateral trading system might play in supporting the implementation of effective national competition policies by developing country members. It featured participation by prominent experts from competition agencies, universities and civil society organizations from within and outside the region as well as from other intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD and the OECD. During the year, preparations started for a similar workshop to be held in Cape Town, South Africa, for the benefit of African WTO members and observers, in February 2001. During 2000, a representative of the WTO secretariat participated in a series of regional meetings organized by UNCTAD in preparation for the Fourth Review Conference on the UN Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, which was held in Geneva from 25 to 29 September 2000. In particular, the secretariat participated in regional meetings held in Jaipur, India (April 2000); Kiev, Ukraine (July 2000); Casablanca, Morocco (July 2000); and San Jose, Costa Rica (August-September 2000), at which updates were provided to delegates on the ongoing exploratory work and state of play on competition policy in the WTO. In addition, a

representative of the secretariat participated as a speaker in several ad hoc seminars, workshops and similar events. These included (a) a University of Geneva summer course on issues relating to competition policy and the multilateral trading system, attended by a number of delegates from developing countries; (b) a round-table meeting on competition policy and pro-poor development, organized by the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom in London (July 2000); (c) an APEC Regional Seminar on WTO Issues: Investment and Competition Policies, in Manila (November 2000); and (d) the launch meeting of a project organized by the Consumer Unity and Trust Society to review the implementation of competition policy in a number of countries in Asia and southern Africa. The WTO representative also participated as an instructor in an intensive week-long course on competition policy organized by the World Bank in cooperation with the Government of Singapore. Also during 2000, work continued on the preparation of a volume of policy analysis based on four symposia on issues relating to competition policy, development and the multilateral trading system that were held in Geneva in 1997-1999 organized by the WTO secretariat with financial assistance from, and participation by staff of, UNCTAD and the World Bank. The volume is expected to be available in the autumn of 2001.

B. Requests for technical assistance

36. Below are extracts from replies received by the UNCTAD secretariat which are related to requests for technical assistance, with identification of specific competition law and policy areas or issues which the States concerned would wish to see receive priority attention.

Barbados

37. Barbados is preparing a competition policy document with a view to engaging external consultants to draw up competition legislation. Assistance will also be sought from UNCTAD member States in establishing the competition function of the recently established Fair Trading Commission. In addition, UNCTAD's assistance will be sought in the running of the UNCTAD course entitled "Implementation of Competition Law" in Barbados in the near future.

Cape Verde

38. The Government recently (in January 2000) adopted a competition law but this has not yet been brought under regulation. It would therefore be very useful if Cape Verde could be given technical assistance to train human resources in competition law and policy in the near future.

China

39. It is expected that relevant international organizations such as UNCTAD and OECD could invite the core members of the group drafting the Anti-monopoly Law to undertake studies overseas for a period ranging from six months to a year. It is also expected that the relevant international organizations and the competition authorities of their member countries could invite the backbone of the Chinese competition authority to practise overseas for three to six months in order to acquire a thorough knowledge of competition legislation and law enforcement.

Fiji

40. Fiji requests assistance in the following areas: (a) technical assistance in the legal area and in administration of a regulatory body as established under the Commerce Act; (b) provision of specialist training courses for enforcement officers, and Commissioners and staff of the Commerce Commission; and (c) implementation of joint bilateral cooperation activities with other countries.

Ghana

41. Ghana does not have a law on competition. The Bill on the subject is currently undergoing legislative procedures. Technical assistance will therefore be required in the following areas: (a) attachment courses in institutions in countries operating competition law; and (b) a national awareness seminar on competition policy and law. The target audience will consist of business operators, public sector policy formulators and parliamentarians.

Malta

42. In view of the need to introduce merger control, the Consumer and Competition Division (EU and International Relations) would like to receive expert assistance in drafting a law on that subject and also regarding the way in which mergers should be tackled, given the particular circumstances of a small market economy.

Peru

43. A request has been made for places on courses and internships for INDECOPI officials in various competition bodies where they can receive training in methodologies for analysing markets and dealing with cases of behaviour amounting to abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive practices. INDECOPI suggests that UNCTAD should encourage organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank and IDB (through its intra-regional technical cooperation programme, CT/INTRA), to set up a special budget line for the training and exchange of experts on competition policy, which would make it possible to offer specialized internships for officials from developing countries in organizations with a proven track record and to offer short-term consultancies. It could also provide a common denominator at the international level for the way competition cases are dealt with and for the competition policies introduced in each country.

Thailand

44. Thailand wishes greater priority to be given to responding to the specific needs of developing countries. From its point of view, such needs include (a) sponsoring officials from Thailand's competition agency to work in the competition agencies of countries with competition experience; (b) having experts from experienced competition agencies guide and assist Thailand's competition agency, particularly in procedural matters that arise in the early years of new competition agencies; and, (c) provision of resource persons and financial support by developed countries to organize training and workshops. As regards the technical assistance in the area of competition policy already being provided by a number of donors, including the

World Bank, UNCTAD, the OECD and a number of individual Governments, Thailand believes that more could be achieved with the available resources if there was greater coordination of the activities involved.

Ukraine

45. Ukraine would be interested in participating in technical assistance projects which would make possible a comprehensive approach to competition policy and legislation in Ukraine. Such projects include (a) transfer of legislation conformity analysis methodology (conformity of current Ukrainian competition policy and legislation with European and international requirements); (b) assistance in bringing national competition legislation into line with European and international legislation; (c) competition policy seminars to be held by the Ministry of Economy; (d) short-term education/trainee programmes in appropriate educational centres/institutions abroad for Ukrainian officials dealing with competition policy issues; and (e) publication of joint research results (in English and Ukrainian) in order to inform the appropriate legislative and executive authority officials about issues relating to competition policy and legislation development in Ukraine.

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EXPERIENCES GAINED SO FAR ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON COMPETITION POLICY ISSUES AND THE MECHANISMS USED

Revised report by the UNCTAD secretariat

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Executive Summary

This report focuses on three types of international instruments dealing with competition law and policy, namely: bilateral **or tripartite** competition law enforcement cooperation agreements; free trade, customs union or common market agreements; and multilateral instruments. The implementation of such agreements has helped to minimize conflicts among Governments and to facilitate enforcement in this area. However, several concerns continue to impede the further development of enforcement cooperation. Moreover, developing countries have not so far significantly participated in such cooperation. To overcome such impediments and to promote the participation of developing countries, it would be necessary to build up mutual confidence gradually, by evolving from simple to more complex cooperation agreements. Balanced cooperation among developing countries would provide a learning experience and help ensure that cooperation with more advanced partners was fruitful. Free trade or common market agreements might provide a conducive framework for this purpose, but regional rules, institutions and mechanisms would need to be adapted accordingly, and a degree of compatibility ensured among national, subregional and interregional competition regimes.

The consultations mechanism established under the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices might be used to discuss how this might be done and what might be the appropriate balance between convergence and diversity in competition laws and policies; it might also promote cooperation in specific cases. Such consultations could provide an input to the ongoing discussions or any future negotiations within the World Trade Organization **or a Global Competition Forum (should it be established). Moreover, in order to implement the mandate provided by the Fourth Review Conference, the IGE might adopt a "bottom-up" approach, giving priority to the examination of: (a) provisions contained in relevant OECD recommendations or bilateral cooperation agreements which might be included in a model (or models) of cooperation agreements; (b) on a comparative basis, the rules and procedures applicable to cooperation on competition law and policy within the framework of free trade, partnership, common market or single market agreements; (c) how such cooperation provisions in all these types of agreements would work in hypothetical cases, particularly those involving mergers or cartels with an international character, with the aim of eventually facilitating consultations upon real cases; and (d) how the principle of preferential or differential treatment for developing countries might be reflected in this context. This would prepare the ground for a subsequent assessment of the possible implications that might be drawn for a balanced multilateral regime in this area and how diversity and compatibility/convergence among national, bilateral, regional and multilateral regimes might be catered for or reconciled in peer reviews, mediation or alternative arrangements.**

INTRODUCTION

1. * **A first UNCTAD secretariat report with the same title as the present report (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/11) was presented to the Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy at its second session, held from 7 to 9 June 1999.**[1] **At the request of the Group of Experts, a revised report on this subject (TD/RBP/CONF.5/4) was presented to the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (25 to 29 September 2000). In line with the resolution adopted by the Review Conference, this further revised report will be submitted to the third session of the Group of Experts as requested. This report** * takes into account verbal and written commentary and information received from member States and also updates the information provided in the previous report.[2] Additions to the text have been indicated in bold script **and** deletions have been indicated with * **an asterisk**.

2. For the purposes of this study, international cooperation in the area of competition law and policy is interpreted in a broad sense, covering cooperation aimed at: (a) avoiding conflicts between Governments; (b) facilitating enforcement against restrictive business practices (RBPs) (which is reciprocal in principle); (c) provision of technical assistance for adopting, reforming or enforcing competition law and policy by countries which are more experienced in this domain to those less experienced; (d) the promotion of convergence or harmonization of competition laws or policies; and (e) within the context of a regional grouping, the strengthening of economic integration. However, * **this report** concentrates on (a) and (b) (experiences in respect of technical assistance are discussed in TD/B/COM.2/CLP/12). It should be noted that, in practice, any cooperation agreement or cooperative activity may have more than one of these objectives, which are indeed often interlinked.

3. International cooperation in this area can take place either on an informal basis, or in pursuit of the application of an international instrument (the term "instrument" is used here to cover both legally binding treaties or agreements and non-binding recommendations or undertakings). Chapter I describes different types of bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral cooperation instruments with a bearing on competition law and policy. Chapter II describes experiences in cooperation on competition law and policy. Factors which have either facilitated cooperation or **that have** made it more difficult are analysed and suggestions are made as to how **this cooperation** * might be developed. Finally, **the** three annexes to this study * list a selection of three types of instruments dealing with competition law and policy, namely: bilateral agreements on competition law enforcement; free trade, customs union or common market agreements; and multilateral and plurilateral instruments. Only instruments currently in force are referred to, in **an approximate** * chronological order.

Chapter I

INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

A. Overview

4. This chapter distinguishes among the following six types of international instruments dealing with competition law and policy (the first four types * are **primarily** of a bilateral nature): (a) bilateral **or tripartite** agreements focusing on cooperation in competition law enforcement; (b) mutual legal assistance treaties, which would apply to criminal antitrust cases as well as other criminal cases; (c) friendship, commerce and navigation treaties concluded between the United States and several other countries, which include clauses referring to cooperation on antitrust matters; (d) agreements for technical cooperation in economic regulation, including competition law and policy; (e) free trade, customs union or common market agreements, including regional or subregional agreements or bilateral agreements concluded within a regional framework, covering competition law and policy as one element in a broader relationship; and (f) multilateral instruments, whether or not they are of a legally binding nature, which are universally applicable or are of a plurilateral nature and cover a range of issues or focus specifically on competition law and policy. In practice, the borderlines between these different categories of instruments are often blurred, while other instruments not mentioned here may also have some bearing on competition law and policy. Some typical provisions of such agreements and notable features of specific agreements are described below. While bilateral enforcement agreements and some multilateral instruments **usually** deal solely with competition law and policy, other types of agreements deal with cooperation on competition law and policy as one element in a wider agreement. Each type of instrument is dealt with in a separate section of this chapter.

B. Bilateral/tripartite agreements on competition law enforcement

5. As **is evident** * from annex 1, the United States is party to * **the majority** of these agreements *; it has such agreements with Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Israel *, Japan **and Mexico**. The European Union has * concluded such agreements only with Canada and the United States but, as discussed below, has agreed to undertake enforcement cooperation with some other countries within the context of free trade, customs union or common market agreements. **Canada has also signed a tripartite agreement with Australia and New Zealand. Whereas that agreement does not make any changes in respect of the exchange of confidential information, a similar tripartite agreement recently signed by Denmark, Iceland and Norway does provide for the possibility of the exchange of confidential information (for which each of their competition authorities obtained prior legislative authority). China has signed cooperation agreements (which cover both fields of unfair competition and antimonopoly) with Kazakhstan and with Russia; in accordance with the terms of the latter, the China State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the Russian Ministry of Antimonopoly Policy and the Support of Entrepreneurship have exchanged experiences relating to competition law and policy and cooperated on law enforcement. Taiwan Province of China has signed cooperation arrangements with Australia and New Zealand.** Typical provisions of many of these agreements include:

notification of enforcement activities affecting the other party's important interests; commitments to take into account the other party's significant interests when investigating or applying remedies against RBPs (traditional comity); consultations to resolve conflicts between the parties' respective laws, policies and national interests; coordinated action in respect of related RBPs occurring in both countries; requests for assistance in investigations when RBPs on the territory of the party requested are adversely affecting the significant interests of the requesting party; requests for enforcement of an order by one party in the territory of another party; and commitments (subject to compatibility with national laws and important interests and to the availability of resources) to give serious consideration to such requests for investigatory assistance or enforcement, including by providing non-confidential information and in a few cases, confidential information (subject to safeguards). **The agreements which the United States has concluded with Brazil and Mexico provide for technical cooperation.** While the older agreements of this type are usually more concerned with avoiding or managing conflicts between Governments arising out of enforcement proceedings (particularly where extraterritorial action is involved), the newer generation of agreements, while still concerned with avoiding conflicts, also often aim at collaborative international action against RBPs.

6. However, these two objectives of conflict avoidance and collaboration against RBPs may be interlinked. Some recent agreements, for instance, provide for "positive comity", under which requests by one country's competition authority to another country's authority to initiate or expand proceedings against RBPs originating in the latter's territory which adversely affect the first country's important interests should be seriously considered by the authority so requested. The response to such requests remains voluntary; conversely, the requesting country retains the right to initiate or re-institute its own enforcement. It is also expressly recognized in such agreements that parallel investigations may be appropriate where both markets are harmed. The first bilateral competition agreement to include positive comity provisions was the 1991 agreement between the United States and the Commission of the European Communities, which was complemented by the 1998 agreement between them (* not **applying** to mergers), which introduces "enhanced positive comity", that is, a presumption that the competition authorities of an affected party will defer or suspend their own enforcement where its consumers are not directly harmed, or where the anti-competitive activities occur principally in and are directed principally towards the other party's territory (**although** the United States federal enforcement agencies are bound by this agreement, * the courts **are not**). Each party pledges to devote adequate resources and its best efforts to investigate matters referred to it and to inform the other side's competition authorities on request, or at reasonable intervals, of the status of the case. In practice, positive comity would appear to come into play mainly when the requesting party is seeking to protect its export trade, reducing recourse to extraterritorial action in such cases. While it would not be necessary for the *requesting* country's competition laws to be infringed for a request to be made, the *requested* country's competition laws would need to be infringed for action to be considered; thus, positive comity would not enable action to be taken against export cartels, for instance.

7. However, such a limitation may not necessarily apply to the provision of investigatory assistance. Under the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, the United States federal competition authorities are authorized (subject to reciprocity and not in the case of mergers) to conclude international agreements providing for the possibility of exchange of confidential information on a case-by-case basis (provided certain conditions are met) and to

employ compulsory processes to acquire information at the request of a foreign competition authority whose important national interests are affected by anti-competitive behaviour organized within the United States, even if such behaviour is not illegal under United States law. The only agreement concluded so far on this basis is the 1997 agreement between the United States and Australia. It has * been recommended that the United States antitrust authorities expand the jurisdictions **over** * which they have modern antitrust cooperation agreements, including those that feature positive comity provisions; cooperative arrangements should be sought with qualified jurisdictions that have newer competition systems as well as those with newly established competition laws.[3] It has also been suggested that cross-border cooperation in reviewing mergers should be encouraged and further deepened and work-sharing arrangements be developed.

C. Mutual legal assistance treaties

8. Antitrust cooperation in criminal cases can take place through bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties applying to criminal matters generally. Although the United States has concluded such treaties with a number of countries, the only one under which antitrust cooperation has taken place is the Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (1990). This provides for, * **among other things**, the **obtaining** of evidence regarding possible criminal offences (including through the use of compulsory processes such as search warrants) and sharing of confidential information (subject to safeguards*).

D. Friendship, commerce and navigation treaties

9. Friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties concluded between the United States and a number of other countries contain clauses relating to cooperation on competition law enforcement. Under the 1954 FCN treaty between Germany and the United States, for instance, each Government **agreed** to consult with the other, at the request of either, with respect to RBPs having harmful effects upon commerce between their respective territories and to take such measures, not precluded by its legislation, as it deems appropriate to eliminate such harmful effects. However, it is now many years since treaties of this nature were concluded between the United States and other countries.

E. Technical cooperation agreements

10. There are also bilateral agreements which organize technical assistance on competition law in the context of assistance on different forms of economic regulation. Under a 1992 technical cooperation agreement between the French Direction-Générale de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) and the Direction-Générale de la Consommation (DGCN) of Gabon, for example, the two authorities **undertook** * to cooperate in such areas as competition policy, consumer protection, unfair competition, product quality and safety and price control. In the implementation of this agreement, the DGCN **had** * sent personnel to centres run by the DGCCRF for short-term or long-term training, initially in price control and **subsequently** * in competition law. There is a similar agreement between France and the Russian Federation.

F. Free trade, customs union or common market agreements

11. These agreements, which are often of a regional nature, may, depending on the degree of integration envisaged among the parties thereto and the scope of supranational powers granted to the institutions created, contain rights and obligations of varying strength and detail relating to, **among other things** *, the adoption or maintenance and effective enforcement of competition laws and policies; competition norms applicable to trade between the parties, sometimes with the concomitant exclusion of anti-dumping and/or countervailing duty trade remedies; substantial harmonization of competition laws; control of subsidies; control of discriminatory or other action by State enterprises or enterprises with special or exclusive rights; enforcement of common norms by supranational institutions; consultations on, and coordination of, enforcement between national and supranational institutions and among national institutions; dispute settlement; and technical assistance.[4] A fundamental difference between such agreements and the types of bilateral agreements referred to above is that the former include substantive competition rules providing for some degree of harmonization (although this is far less pronounced in the case of free trade agreements), rather than just procedural rules relating to cooperation - * no doubt due to their market integration objectives. The most advanced regional system of competition rules is that of the European Union, which is also at the centre of a web of agreements with neighbouring countries involving varying intensities of cooperation in competition law and policy. The competition policy system within the European Union (which, because of its supranational character, goes beyond just inter-State cooperation) also appears to provide a model for some of the subregional groupings in Africa and Latin America, albeit with some variations. An alternative model is that created under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which provides for a much less intense degree of cooperation. Cooperation envisaged so far within the Asia-Pacific region is even less intense, except for the close collaboration between Australia and New Zealand in this area.

12. The European Union has supranational competition rules (relating to RBPs, to public undertakings and undertakings granted special or exclusive rights and to subsidies), which are linked by the Treaty of Rome to the fundamental objective of establishing a common market. These rules apply to practices affecting trade between member States, even if they occur within a single European Union country or an area within a country. There is provision for: coexistence between national and European Union competition laws, subject to the primacy of European Union law; a system for allocating competence among European Union and national competition authorities and courts (which may also apply European Union law), aimed at balancing subsidiarity with the uniformity of the competition regime within the European Union; cooperation in the investigation or evaluation of practices; exchange of documents (including confidential information); representation at hearings; the communication of opinions on draft decisions for comments; and the provision by institutions of the European Union to national institutions of information or rulings on facts or European Union law. However, there are legal obstacles to the exchange of confidential information between the European Commission and national authorities, as well as among national authorities. The Commission has now * **adopted a draft regulation which provides for the devolution** to national jurisdictions **of** its powers under article * **81** of the Treaty of Rome to investigate RBPs and to grant exemptions (article * **82** can already be enforced at the national level); the Commission would continue to undertake enforcement in cases which are of general importance to the **European Union.** * A further step in cooperation has recently been taken by the competition authorities of France, Germany and

the United Kingdom, which have established a single form for the notification of mergers falling within the jurisdiction of at least two of these authorities. Anti-dumping or countervailing duty action among members of the European Union is precluded. Special sectoral arrangements are provided for under the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.

13. Under the Agreement **of** * the European Economic Area (EEA), concluded by the European Union with most countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), all practices liable to impinge on trade and competition among the EEA participants are subject to rules that are virtually identical to European Union competition law. Either the European Commission or the EFTA Surveillance Authority have supranational authority over practices affecting trade within the area (there are rules for allocation of jurisdiction between them). There are provisions for the exchange of information (applying even to confidential information), consultations (including the communication of opinions by an authority in proceedings brought before the other authority), coordinated enforcement and dispute settlement; anti-dumping and countervailing duty action within the EEA is precluded. However, the accession of many former EFTA countries to the European Union has now reduced the practical scope of the Agreement on the EEA. As regards those EFTA countries not party to the EEA, there are procedures under free trade agreements for consultations and conciliation relating to practices affecting trade with the European Union.

14. Under the Europe agreements between the European Union and most Central and Eastern European and Baltic countries, supplemented by implementing rules for the application of the competition provisions applicable to undertakings and to State aid (implementing rules have not yet been adopted in some cases), competition standards based upon European Union competition rules are applicable where trade between the European Union and the other signatory is affected. In addition, the other signatories are bound to ensure the approximation of their existing and future competition legislation with European Union competition law (which is not required under EEA or even European Union rules), and their national legislation to implement the agreements needs to be approved by the association councils established under the agreements. Where cases fall within the competence of both parties, the European Union and the other party are to notify each other of any action envisaged (unless the transmission of information is prohibited by law or is incompatible with their respective interests); notification is also required where a case falling within the exclusive competence of one party would affect the important interests of the other party. Provision is made for consultations and the possibility of requests by one party to the other to take remedial action against RBPs having harmful cross-border effects. Consultation with the association councils is necessary before action can be taken against a practice deemed not to have been adequately dealt with by the other party. The Europe agreements make no provision for supranational competition authorities, and do not apply to trade among the Eastern European countries themselves (unlike among the EFTA members of the EEA). State aid may be granted to enterprises of the Eastern European countries concerned under rules similar to the European Union rules applicable to the least prosperous regions of the European Union. * **Exemptions** are provided for the **granting** * of State aid in connection with the Common Agricultural Policy or the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, or to practices which are necessary for the attainment of the objectives of these two instruments. Enterprises with special or exclusive rights cannot engage in practices enabling them to restrict trade or to discriminate between nationals of the European Union and those of the other countries. Each party must inform the other party before imposing

anti-dumping or countervailing duty measures. Similar obligations have been extended to Cyprus and Turkey under free trade agreements.

15. Under the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, obligations similar to those under the Europe agreements, except in respect of the requirement to align competition rules, have been extended to trade between the European Union and several Mediterranean countries. Implementing rules for these Euro-Mediterranean agreements have not yet been adopted. Negotiations on other Euro-Mediterranean agreements are proceeding with other Mediterranean countries. Less far-reaching partnership and cooperation agreements have also been concluded between the European Union and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), under which the parties agree to work to remedy or remove restrictions on competition, whether caused by enterprises or by State intervention *, to enforce their competition laws and the members of the CIS are to endeavour to ensure that their competition legislation is gradually made compatible with that of the European Union. The granting of export aid is restricted and further negotiations on other types of aid is provided for. Technical assistance is an important component of these agreements. Similar obligations limited to the energy sector are provided for under the Energy Charter Treaty concluded by the European Union with some members of the CIS. Even lower-intensity cooperation is provided for under a network of framework cooperation agreements concluded between the European Union and its member States and respectively, Argentina (2 April 1990), the Central American republics (1993), the member countries of the Andean Pact (21 January 1993), Brazil (29 June 1995), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (15 December 1995) and Chile (21 June 1996). In the context of provisions on cooperation in a broad range of areas, the parties agree to hold a regular dialogue on the monitoring of RBPs, to identify and eliminate obstacles to industrial cooperation by means of measures which encourage respect for competition laws and to make resources available for these purposes. Negotiations are under way for the conclusion of free trade agreements with Chile and MERCOSUR; agreements have been concluded with Mexico and South Africa which provide * mechanisms for the enforcement of both parties' competition laws, **as well as cooperation procedures (including elements of both traditional and positive comity) and technical assistance**. The * Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the EU and its member States (the Cotonou Agreement) provides that the parties will reinforce cooperation for formulating and supporting effective competition policies with the appropriate national competition agencies so as to progressively ensure effective enforcement, including by assistance in drafting and enforcing an appropriate legal framework.

16. While the European Union is at the centre of agreements with all of these countries or regional groupings, agreements have also been concluded among some of the countries which are party to agreements with the European Union. The EFTA countries not party to the EEA have available long-standing procedures for mandatory consultations and dispute settlement relating to practices affecting trade among EFTA countries. Free trade agreements with competition provisions have also been concluded by some EFTA countries and by Israel with some Eastern European countries, as well as within this latter group of countries, under the Central European Free Trade Agreement (which provides for general information exchange and notification of individual cases). Cooperation agreements on anti-monopoly matters have been concluded by Poland with Ukraine (December 1993) and with the Russian Federation (March 1994); agreements have also been concluded by Romania with Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia and the Russian Federation. **The Romanian competition authority**

has undertaken case-specific cooperation with the authorities of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary and Poland relating to markets for tobacco, cement and pharmacy services. The CIS has also agreed, in the context of the creation of an economic union among its members, to create conditions for fair competition, including a mechanism for anti-monopoly regulation. A Treaty on Conducting the Agreed Antimonopoly Policy has now been signed; the Coordination Council of the Anti-monopoly Agencies monitors its implementation and provides a mechanism for exchanging experiences and for assisting in the improvement and the implementation of national legislation. But all the agreements to which the European Union is not a party tend to involve relatively weaker rights and obligations.

17. Competition law and policy is starting to be addressed more extensively in African subregional agreements, often on the basis of the model of the Treaty of Rome. The 1964 Brazzaville Treaty Establishing the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), already provided that means should be found to achieve the progressive elimination of RBPs in trade among member States. The Treaty Establishing the Economic and Monetary Community of Ceatral Africa (CEMAC) which, when in force, will replace the UDEAC treaty, provides for the establishment of common competition rules to control both RBPs and **Government *** activities; two draft regulations dealing respectively with these two subjects, are currently being elaborated. In pursuance of the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, it is also proposed to elaborate and adopt a uniform act dealing with competition law, which would have direct legal effect on the territory of its 16 member States from West and Central Africa.[5] Under the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the member States agree, in terms similar to article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, to prohibit RBPs which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, with a proviso for the granting of exemptions by the COMESA Council. The Council is to elaborate regulations on competition within member States. **Moreover, a regional competition policy will be formulated and implemented which will also harmonize existing national competition policies.** [6] Subsidies distorting competition which affect trade among member States are also prohibited, subject to some exceptions. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has agreed that member States shall implement measures within the Community that prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition.

18. In the Latin American **and Caribbean** region, **the recently adopted Protocol VIII to** the 1973 Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) *** provides that the Community shall establish appropriate norms and institutional arrangements to prohibit and penalize anti-competitive conduct (the Protocol does not apply to mergers), while member States shall adopt competition legislation, establish institutions and procedures for enforcement and ensure access to enforcement authorities by nationals of other member States. A Competition Commission is established at the regional level to apply competition rules in respect of anti-competitive cross-border business conduct, promote competition in the Community and coordinate the implementation of the Community Competition Policy - it is to collaborate on enforcement with national competition authorities.** More recently, MERCOSUR has adopted a protocol on competition policy proscribing individual conduct or concerted agreements impeding, restricting or distorting competition or free access to markets or abusing a dominant position in a relevant regional market within MERCOSUR and affecting trade between its member States. The MERCOSUR Technical Committee on Competition

Policy and Commerce Commission may issue orders to enforce these norms, which would be implemented by national agencies of the member countries, with limited supranational supervision. Common norms to control anti-competitive acts and agreements are expected to be completed soon and national competition agencies are to adopt measures to enhance cooperation in such areas as information exchange, training and joint investigations. A dispute-settlement system has been set up. The treatment of anti-dumping within MERCOSUR is to be * **reviewed**. Decision 285 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement (established under the Andean Pact) also provides for the prevention of, or remedies against, distortions to competition resulting from RBPs. However, unlike MERCOSUR, Andean Pact institutions have supranational powers; member States or any enterprise with a legitimate interest may request the Board of the Cartagena Agreement for authorization to apply measures to prevent or correct the threat of injury or injury to production or exports and which are a consequence of RBPs and the Board's orders have direct effect in member States' legal orders. Anti-dumping action or countervailing duty action among Andean Pact countries is regulated but not precluded.

19. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, the United States and Mexico provides for each party to adopt or maintain measures to proscribe or take action against RBPs, to consult with the other parties on the effectiveness of such measures and to cooperate on enforcement issues, including through mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and the exchange of information on enforcement in the free trade area. However, detailed procedures for cooperation are not set out and recourse to dispute settlement in competition policy matters is excluded. There are also provisions that state that monopolies or State enterprises should not operate in a manner which is inconsistent with the Agreement, nullifies or impairs its benefits, or discriminates in the sale of goods or services. A working group has been established to report on relevant issues concerning the relationship between competition law and trade polices in the free trade area. Similar provisions are contained in the free trade agreement between Canada and Chile, with the exception of the establishment of a Working Group.[7] There * **is** also **a** competition * **chapter** in the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement. **Chile has also signed Free Trade Agreements, with some Central American countries, containing chapters on competition policy, including RBP control and the regulation of State monopolies.** The so-called "G3 Agreement" between Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela is more limited applying only to State-owned monopolies; these are to act only on the basis of commercial considerations in operations on their own territories and may not use their monopoly positions to use RBPs in a non-monopolized market in such a way as to affect enterprises in the other member States. A mechanism for cooperation in competition policy has now been created in the context of discussions on the establishment of a free trade area for the Americas. The communiqué adopted on 20 October 1998 at the first Antitrust Summit of the Americas, * attended by most of the countries **of** * the region **with** * competition laws, affirms that participating countries plan to cooperate with one another, in accordance with their respective laws, to improve enforcement, * disseminate best practices in this area (with the emphasis on institutional transparency), * encourage efforts by small economies in the region that do not yet have solid competition regimes to complete the development of their legal frameworks and to advance competition principles in the Negotiating Group on Competition Policy of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.[8]

20. A similar forum for **the exchange** * of views, technical cooperation and discussion of competition issues **was** * established under the auspices of the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation Forum (APEC). * Members have undertaken in the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform (which is a legally non-binding instrument) to introduce or maintain effective, adequate and transparent competition policies or laws and enforcement, to promote competition among APEC economies and to take action in the area of deregulation. Such low-intensity cooperation contrasts with that between Australia and New Zealand, which no longer apply their anti-dumping laws to conduct affecting trade between them and instead apply their competition laws relating to predatory conduct by dominant firms (which have been harmonized). For the purpose of enforcing this, each country's competition authority and courts have "overlapping jurisdiction" - complaints may be filed before them, hearings held and valid and enforceable subpoenas and remedial orders issued in the other country. Separately, a bilateral enforcement agreement provides for extensive investigatory assistance, the exchange of information (subject to rules on confidentiality) and coordinated enforcement.

G. Multilateral and plurilateral instruments

21. The sole universally applicable multilateral instrument in this area is the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (Set), negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD. The numerous instruments formulated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that cover competition law and policy (listed in annex 3) apply only to a restricted group of countries, although the recommendation concerning effective action against hard-core cartels states that it is open to non-OECD member countries to associate themselves with this recommendation and to implement it (and several such countries have indicated interest in associating themselves[9]; and the * Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have been adopted not only by the member **States** * of the OECD but also by some Latin American countries and the Slovak Republic. The Set * and the OECD instruments contain many of the types of provisions adopted in bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements and in free trade, customs union or common market agreements, but with variations, omissions or additional provisions, particularly in the case of the Set. The Set, like the OECD instruments, is concerned with the adverse impact of RBPs on international trade, but is, in addition, concerned with their impact on development. A unique feature of both the Set * and the 1978 and 2000 OECD instruments is that they recommend not only norms to be followed by Governments, but also rules for the conduct of enterprises, with a particular focus on transnational corporations. Both also provide for the adoption or maintenance and effective enforcement of competition laws and policies and recommend competition norms of a general nature to be applied by member States. The Set also provides for work aimed at achieving common approaches in national policies relating to RBPs compatible with the Set (article F.1) and continued work on the elaboration of a model law or laws on RBPs in order to assist developing countries in devising appropriate legislation (article F.2). The OECD instruments do not have such provisions, * **although** the 1998 OECD recommendation recommends convergence in (as well as effective enforcement of) laws prohibiting hard-core cartels. While the Set deals solely with RBP control, the 1986 OECD instrument is also concerned with the interface between competition policy and trade measures; it recommends that policy makers should, when considering a prospective trade measure or reviewing existing measures, evaluate their likely effects, including the impact on the structure and functioning of the relevant markets and it suggests a checklist of the main effects of trade measures, including competition effects. The OECD has also adopted instruments dealing with competition-promoting regulatory reform.

22. The Set * and the OECD instruments all provide for cooperation on enforcement. The OECD instruments having influenced or been inspired by the bilateral enforcement agreements concluded among OECD countries. The 1995 OECD recommendation (which replaces a long series of instruments recommending progressively closer cooperation) provides for notification, consultations, the exchange of non-confidential and confidential information (subject to safeguards), the coordination of investigations, investigatory assistance, traditional and positive comity, consultations and a conciliation mechanism to resolve disputes. The 1998 recommendation encourages cooperation and comity specifically in respect of enforcement against hard-core cartels and provides for transparency and periodic reviews relating to exempted cartels. The Set also provides for consultations (envisaged both within and outside UNCTAD) and the exchange of non-confidential and confidential information. In addition, * **it** contains the following provisions: States should take due account of the extent to which the conduct of enterprises is accepted under applicable legislation (article C.6); States, particularly developed countries, should, in controlling RBPs, take into account the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries (article C.7); and States should seek appropriate measures to control RBPs within their competence when it comes to their attention that RBPs adversely affect international trade, particularly the trade and development of developing countries (article E.4). The Set makes no provision for dispute settlement; the Intergovernmental Group of Experts or its subsidiary organs are proscribed from acting like a tribunal or otherwise passing judgement on the activities or conduct of individual Governments or enterprises in connection with specific business transactions (article G.4). An important component * not present in the OECD instruments is the provision of technical assistance to developing countries, both by countries with greater expertise in this area and by UNCTAD.

23. Unlike the Set and the above-mentioned OECD recommendations, the Uruguay Round agreements are legally binding and are backed by strong dispute-settlement mechanisms. Different provisions with a bearing on competition law and policy are included in, * **among other things**, the articles or agreements dealing with: State enterprises and enterprises with exclusive rights; anti-dumping; subsidies; safeguards; trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs); trade-related aspects of investment measures (TRIMs); and trade in services, particularly telecommunications and financial services. Those provisions of a substantive character are not reviewed here in detail, as they have already been covered in a previous study by the UNCTAD secretariat.[10] Instead, an analysis is undertaken in terms of obligations relating to consultations, the exchange of non-confidential and confidential information and positive comity. Apart from the general consultation procedures applicable to all WTO-related disputes, special consultation procedures are provided under: (a) the GATT Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices of 18 November 1960;[11] (b) the TRIPs Agreement, whereby a WTO member considering competition enforcement against a firm of another member can seek consultations with that member, aimed at securing compliance, while a country whose firms are subject to such action may also ask for consultations; and (c) the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in respect of certain business practices by a monopoly supplier of services and an exclusive supplier. The latter two agreements also provide for the exchange of non-confidential information and subject to domestic laws and a satisfactory agreement concerning the safeguarding of confidentiality of confidential information. A degree of positive comity is provided for under the 1960 Decision;

the party to whom a request for consultations is addressed shall, if it agrees that such harmful effects are present, take such measures as it deems appropriate to eliminate these effects. The label of positive comity might also be attached to the obligation on contracting parties under article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 (now incorporated in GATT 1994) to ensure that State enterprises or private enterprises with exclusive rights act in a non-discriminatory manner in importing or exporting goods and in particular **abide by** to the GATS obligations to control certain practices by monopoly suppliers of services and exclusive service suppliers (backed by more detailed obligations in the areas of telecommunications and to a lesser extent, financial services).

Chapter II

ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION

A. Overview

24. Enforcement cooperation has, in cases with international implications, helped to improve the quality and effectiveness of enforcement and decrease its cost, helping to resolve difficulties in obtaining access to information held in other countries, in serving process or in undertaking enforcement against entities whose headquarters or assets are located abroad. It has also reduced friction that might arise between countries because of recourse to extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws or of jurisidictional conflicts. However, difficulties are sometimes experienced in implementing such cooperation. **Enforcement cooperation** * takes place primarily between developed countries in the application of bilateral enforcement agreements, mutual legal assistance treaties (limited to criminal action against cartels), free trade, customs union or common market agreements and the relevant OECD instruments. There is no evidence that FCN treaties have been utilized as vehicles for cooperation.[12] **Moreover** *, while the maintenance of informal links with other competition authorities has been an important way of keeping informed of developments in competition law and policy in other jurisdictions **through the** * exchanging **of** views, **the usefulness of** such informal cooperation has been found to be * limited **in cases** * where an authority requires enforcement assistance in a particular matter, or confidential information.[13] The bilateral cooperation experiences of the European Union and the United States are reviewed below; the impediments to cooperation, as well as factors conducive to cooperation, are identified; and some suggestions are made as to how developing countries might play a more prominent role in enforcement cooperation, using the frameworks provided by regional groupings and by the Set of Principles and Rules.

B. Cooperation between the European Union and the United States

25. The effect of the 1991 Agreement between the European Union and the United States was to stimulate a spirit of cooperation among the competition authorities of both jurisdictions. **Although** * much of the cooperation undertaken in the implementation of the Agreement could have taken place before, it spurred the competition authorities concerned to "seek opportunities for cooperation in a more structured and proactive way."[14] The Agreement has been a vehicle * for exchanging information and views on enforcement policy developments and for cooperation in individual cases. There is now routine notification of cases which concern the important interests of the other party.[15] Successive notifications may occur in the same case; in a merger case, for example, notification may be undertaken at the outset, again when the decision is taken to initiate proceedings and again before the final decision is taken, far enough in advance to enable the other party's views to be taken into account. Where both the European Union and United States authorities undertake proceedings in respect of the same transaction, there is coordination of enforcement activities, which may involve the exchange of information and discussions on the following: the timing of * respective procedures; the delimitation of relevant markets (mainly product markets, discussions on geographical markets being limited because each authority is concentrating on effects on its own market); the anti-competitive effects of transactions; remedies that might be envisaged and the avoidance of conflict between them; and the law of and publicly available facts in the **other's** * jurisdiction. In one recent case, there has

been successful synchronization of investigations and searches, thus avoiding the risk of destruction of evidence in the **other's** * jurisdiction.[16] Even where these authorities take different views on certain points, such contacts have enabled them to understand each other's thinking and refine * analyses accordingly. However, in merger cases, differing deadlines for review have limited the scope for cooperation, although useful results have still been obtained.

26. The main obstacle to coordinated enforcement has been that it can often only be based on exchanges of non-confidential information (however, a distinction is made between confidential agency information, which may be shared relatively more easily and confidential business information, which is prohibited by law from being shared unless the enterprises concerned have waived their objections to the exchange of confidential information). Such waivers have been granted only where it is in the interests of the enterprises to do so. * **Moreover**, enterprises are often reluctant to allow information to be shared if it might disclose RBPs and expose them to sanctions in both jurisdictions. No waivers have so far been provided in cartel investigations. Where enterprises have been prepared to waive their objections to the exchange of confidential information, this has facilitated a successful outcome. In the Microsoft case, for instance, such a waiver enabled the European Union and United States authorities to coordinate their investigations in respect of similar practices by a dominant computer software firm in both jurisdictions, * **contributing** to similar settlements being reached, despite substantive differences in competition laws.[17] However, even the exchange of non-confidential information has helped * draw attention to possible anti-competitive behaviour, improved the handling of cases and contributed to similarity in the analyses undertaken by the different authorities and the compatibility of remedies.

27. Such cooperation has not always made it possible to avoid conflicting views or to reach commonly accepted solutions, **due to** * differences in laws, in economic doctrines, in the effects on each market, or in the evidence available in each jurisdiction. In the Upjohn/Pharmacia merger, for instance, the European Commission cleared a merger, but the United States Federal Trade Commission required the divestiture of some United States assets; similarly, the Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz merger was cleared by the European Commission, but the Federal Trade Commission, considering that the "innovation market" would be adversely affected, ordered the licensing of gene therapy rights and other technology (the concept of an "innovation market" is not used in the European Union, and there are differences in the scope of intellectual property rights in each jurisdiction).[18] On the other hand, in the Boeing/MDD case, involving the merger of two United States aircraft manufacturing companies, the Federal Trade Commission cleared the merger, but the European Commission intervened because it considered that the merger would give the companies concerned a strengthened position of dominance in the market for large aircraft. However, in this situation, traditional comity came into play to some extent; the European Commission took into account, to the extent consistent with European Union law, concerns expressed by the United States Government relating to important United States defence interests and to the undesirability of divestiture, limited the scope of its action to the civil side of the companies' operations and approved the merger subject to a number of conditions, which did not include divestiture. As regards positive comity, it has normally been possible to take into account concerns expressed in an informal manner, with one party simply deferring its investigations while awaiting the outcome of investigations in the other jurisdiction, being kept informed of progress and being provided with the opportunity to comment on the proposed remedy. This happened, for example, in the A.C. Nielsen case (involving abuses of dominance

in * contracting practices by a United States firm providing retail tracking services, which may have been adversely affecting exports to Europe by its competitors based in the United States).[19] Positive comity procedures have, * **to date**, only been formally activated once; **a request by** the United States Department of Justice * **that** the European Commission * investigate allegations that a computerized reservation system **(CRS)** set up by * **four** European airlines * **provided more favourable treatment to these airlines than that granted to a CRS** * based in the United States **(preventing the latter** from competing in European markets**).** * **This led the Commission to undertake proceedings against one of the airlines participating in the European CRS (no evidence was found against the other airlines). Eventually, the case was dropped when the airline concerned agreed with the American CRS that it would grant the latter, as well as other CRS, conditions equivalent to those granted to the European CRS.**[20] Dissatisfaction has been expressed by some members of the United States Congress with the operation of positive comity, because it is considered not to have led to improved market access for United States exports so far. United States business people have also alleged that there have been delays in investigations by the European Commission **and** that there are insufficient powers to compel the discovery of documents, * **as well as** that evidentiary standards are too high. However, the Department of Justice has expressed confidence in the quality of European Union enforcement, * **stating** that positive comity will need time to work, even if it may not have immediate success and **that it** is better than the alternative.[21] The Federal Trade Commission has also stated that disagreements are the exception rather than the rule and that there is a "slow but steady convergence of review and mutual respect" between the United States and European Union.[22]

C. Impediments and factors conducive to cooperation

28. As appears from the above, cooperation is facilitated by a degree of commonality of approach; differences in substantive competition laws or doctrines, enforcement practices or procedures or interpretations of the underlying facts may all constitute impediments. Differences in legal doctrines relating to extraterritoriality may also adversely affect cooperation; while the strengthening of cooperation between the European Union and the United States may have been facilitated by the **European Union's** * assertion of jurisdiction based on "objective" territoriality[23] (which has some similarities with extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon the "effects doctrine" asserted by the United States), substantial differences still persist.[24] The view has **also** been expressed that the fundamental objection of the United Kingdom Government and many others, to the extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust law has significantly limited the cooperation possible.[25] Cooperation may also be limited by concerns about having enforcement priorities and resource allocation determined by positive comity requests from other countries, or about exposing national firms to sanctions by a foreign authority or court (including, where applicable, orders of United States courts for payment of treble damages in private suits following on from action by enforcement agencies).[26] Reciprocity would also be a concern. As noted in chapter I, it is a requirement, for instance, under the provisions of the United States International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994. Under the Canadian Competition Act, the Competition Bureau has the authority to communicate confidential information to a foreign competition authority where doing so would advance the Canadian case (which would include a joint Canadian/foreign case). Most often, this would occur where the foreign authority would be able to provide the Bureau with information or other assistance in return. The Bureau does not have the authority to communicate confidential information solely

to advance a foreign case of a civil nature. It does have such authority in criminal antitrust cases falling under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (however, such treaties do not cover conduct which would not be treated as criminal under Canadian law). The German Monopolies Commission (which is an independent body with advisory status) has proposed that reciprocity and the "earmarking" of confidential information, as well as the justified interests of the companies concerned, should be taken into account in concluding cooperation agreements. * **Furthermore**, such agreements might initially be limited to those countries that have secrecy regulations themselves, guarantee the implementation of those regulations and choose to cooperate.[27] Cooperation may also be hampered by perceptions of national industrial or trade policies influencing competition decisions, or inspiring leakage of confidential information - a senior official of the European Union has suggested that a lesson **drawn** from the Boeing case, is that successful cooperation depends on rigorous economic analysis based on strictly legal rules. * Issues of trade policy should not be allowed to become entwined with competition issues when scrutinizing transactions.[28] * **In another case**, a senior official from the Department of Justice, discussing enforcement against international cartels, * stated that the greatest impediment to cooperation is the fear, or the suspicion, that evidence will be used for trade purposes.[29] While the trend toward greater convergence in this area[30] may help to reduce such considerations and concerns, they will not disappear, since what may maximize welfare in one country may reduce it in another. **However, whereas in the past, cooperation obstacles among competition authorities of OECD countries were connected with broad policy concerns relating to such things as differential sanctions and different substantive procedural rules - issues which are now seen in more pragmatic terms as a question of assessing likely benefits and costs.** [31]

29. Competition law and policy have also been linked more directly to trade issues. A version of positive comity (in terms of competition advocacy rather than enforcement) has operated with some success on an informal level between the United States and other countries. First within the context of the Structural Impediments Initiative in 1989 and then through the Deregulation and Competition Policy Working Group set up under the Framework for a New Economic Partnership in 1993, the United States has strongly encouraged a more stringent competition policy in Japan, especially in instances where it perceived anti-competitive activity as impeding competition from foreign products.[32] Similar initiatives have been taken through the Competition Policy Working Group set up within the context of the Dialogue for Economic Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea. As a result, the Republic of Korea decided to strengthen its competition law and enforcement, apply competition principles in deregulation, improve access to television and radio advertising slots, address RBPs by industry associations and revise regulations and guidelines that might impede pro-competitive activities.[33] In * **an important** case, the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes was invoked by the United States in relation to alleged Japanese measures affecting the distribution and sale of imported consumer photographic film and paper (contrary to GATT 1994), as well as a number of measures allegedly affecting distribution services in general (contrary to GATS). Consultations were also requested by both the United States and Japan, in pursuance of the 1960 GATT Decision, in respect of alleged RBPs affecting imports of photographic film and paper into each other's markets (the European Union also asked to join in these consultations). The procedures under GATS and the 1960 Decision were suspended, while the complaint under GATT 1994 was rejected by the Dispute Settlement Panel.[34]

30. Therefore, it is likely that countries will be prepared to cooperate voluntarily only if there is a shared perception of common interest and mutual benefit. This may be one reason why enforcement cooperation agreements leave such a large measure of discretion to the parties * **over** whether or not to cooperate in individual cases. It may also help * explain why some free trade agreements exclude competition law and policy issues from the purview of dispute settlement and why the conciliation machinery provided for in successive OECD recommendations on this subject * **have** not been resorted to (although, in 1987, the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices took the view that this was mainly because the notification, exchange of information and consultation procedures provided for had been effective in avoiding or resolving conflicts).[35] The difficulty of enforcing these agreements may in fact facilitate their conclusion. * **In this manner** the potential impediments to cooperation identified above would be weighed against the benefits from the conclusion or further development of enforcement cooperation agreements. Thus, a senior official of the European Commission has called for the conclusion of "second-generation" cooperation agreements making it possible to share confidential information and use compulsory process on behalf of other countries. This **same** official does not accept that concerns relating to differences between competition rules and to risks that confidential information might be used * **to** harm European interests should prevent this, as the experiences of existing cooperation between the European Union and the United States show that the views of the parties are more often likely to coincide than to differ, as differences between rules are less important in the case of the most serious infringements (particularly in the case of hard-core cartels and the most serious abuses of dominance) and as discrepancies between rules in other areas have not precluded effective cooperation.[36] * **Moreover**, he has expressed the view that a key ingredient in successful enforcement cooperation is mutual confidence in enforcement capabilities and in respect for confidentiality, arising from a shared commitment to upholding the competitive process.[37] Building-up such mutual confidence requires a progressive approach. It has been suggested that after starting with a simple cooperation agreement, countries could evolve to more complex agreements involving the exchange of confidential information as confidence and a tradition of cooperation is built up, increasing the level of both obligation and mutual benefit, * **while** the extent and intensity of cooperation would depend on institutional capabilities, the actual experience of cooperation and the degree of trust built-up over time.[38] Even agreements which might not be regarded as optimal by all parties may pave the way for further agreements. For instance, before the 1997 Agreement between the United States and Australia was concluded, the view was expressed that the 1982 Agreement between the two countries was one-sided, but that the experience of its implementation had provided a more conducive environment for expanding cooperation.[39] For the purpose of strengthening enforcement cooperation, it has been suggested that developing common standards is important and that a balance between transparency and the protection of confidential information should be found, as an international consensus on the latter would facilitate the conclusion of agreements featuring close cooperation between enforcement authorities.[40] * **Nevertheless**, it has also been suggested that a broader limitation to bilateral cooperation * tends to take place among countries which are economically interdependent and share a similar level of experience in competition law enforcement or the same ideas on competition policy.[41]

D. Developing countries, regional groupings and the Set of Principles and Rules

31. Developing countries have not so far participated to any great extent in intensive case-specific enforcement cooperation. In the *French/West African Shipowners' Committees*[42] case, for instance, the European Commission brought a case against cartels or exclusionary abuses by liner conferences or shipowners' committees with dominant positions in the maritime traffic between Europe and 11 West and Central African States. In its decision, which had pro-competitive effects in the countries concerned,[43] the Commission indicated that it was ready to enter into talks with the authorities of these countries with a view to helping their carriers secure a greater share of the traffic generated by their external trade. However, it appears that, prior to taking its decision, the Commission had not consulted with the African countries concerned, most of which did not have functioning competition laws or institutions at that time, and whose shipping authorities had in fact authorized cargo reservations by the shipping companies concerned. The circumstances were similar in the *CEWAL Liner Conference* case, involving traffic to Angola and the Congo.[44] Enforcement cooperation between the European Union and the countries concerned might not only have led to traditional comity coming into play, but might also have facilitated data-gathering by the Commission (it took five years for the Commission to take a decision in the *Shipowners* case). However, developing countries' competition authorities now sometimes participate in exchanges of general information and some case-specific technical assistance has occasionally been provided. For example, the Kenyan Monopolies and Prices Commission provided consultancy services to the Zambian Competition Commission in respect of a beer sector case in Zambia.[45] To the extent that enforcement cooperation is not strengthened, there is also a higher risk that, as developing countries become more active in this area, firms will have to deal with the procedures and possibly inconsistent orders of several jurisdictions - as happened in the *Gillette/Wilkinson* case (where a proposed merger was examined in 14 jurisdictions, including Brazil and South Africa).[46] Conversely, assistance with information-gathering and enforcement in relation to RBPs originating overseas and affecting their markets would be a major potential benefit for developing countries entering into enforcement cooperation agreements. For example, in two cases in the United States where international cartels for lysine (an ingredient in animal feed) and citric acid were successfully prosecuted, the Department of Justice discovered evidence of price-fixing and market allocation relevant to other countries, but could not share such evidence with those countries * not party to antitrust cooperation agreements with the United States.[47]

32. The time is now ripe for change. The majority of developing countries have adopted or are in the process of drafting competition laws and this trend is continuing. Fully effective implementation of all such competition laws will take time, depending on a gradual learning process, but progress is being made. The initiation and progressive practice of enforcement cooperation would both enhance effective implementation of competition laws and prepare the ground for more advanced cooperation. Enforcement cooperation among developing countries with limited experience in this area, but facing similar circumstances, may be of a more balanced character than cooperation with countries with more experience in this area, and would also constitute a learning experience, ensuring that cooperation with more advanced partners is fruitful.

33. While the eventual conclusion of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements would be necessary for full cooperation to take place, enforcement cooperation might initially take place on an informal basis. This would be facilitated by the initiation of informal discussions and exchanges of general information, including within the framework of any free trade, customs union or common market agreements to which the countries concerned are party. Within regional or subregional groupings, political will or relative uniformity of economic development and culture may make it easier to build up mutual trust and perception of common interests (which may be looked at within the context of the overall relationship rather than just in terms of competition law and policy).

34. There is little evidence that developing countries party to such agreements have so far taken advantage of them, either to undertake enforcement cooperation or to prepare the ground for it. Direct use of free trade or common market agreements for enforcement cooperation appears * to have taken place only within the European Union or the EEA, * **although** in other cases * **they have** provided a framework conducive to bilateral cooperation. Within NAFTA, for example, the Working Group on Competition and Trade has so far focused on studying members' competition laws, as well as transborder cases. * **This Group** has now essentially completed its work, but competition and trade officials still meet to continue, among other objectives, to explore the possibility of formal cooperation arrangements. The Mexican competition authority has also had extensive bilateral consultations with the Canadian and United States authorities on technical aspects of applying competition law and on specific cases, including cases involving RBPs with a transborder dimension (cases with implications for other member countries are notified).[48] Even within regional groupings, however, enforcement cooperation may be limited by some of the concerns and differences highlighted above, **as well as** by the fact that regional institutions or mechanisms are not adapted for enforcement cooperation. **Enforcement cooperation may also be limited** * simply because trade is limited between some countries in the grouping or RBPs affecting such trade are rare. Therefore, it is likely that, at least initially, cooperation will develop in an asymmetrical manner among different member countries within regional groupings. Within MERCOSUR, for instance, it has been suggested that there may be little incentive to open and conduct investigations when trade interests are involved, given the relative institutional weights of the regional Committee for the Defence of Competition and the Commerce Commission. It has also been suggested that problems may arise from ambiguities in the definitions of RBPs and in institutional mandates, **from the number of steps to be followed in the decision-making process, lack of clarity in the delimitation between national and MERCOSUR jurisdictions,** as well as from asymmetries among member States in terms of the adoption and implementation of competition laws.[49] While several agreements between competition authorities of MERCOSUR member States have been concluded, providing for procedures for reciprocal consultations and technical assistance, linkages have so far been generated mainly between the Argentine and Brazilian authorities, helping to unify criteria applied by the two authorities.[50] Within the Andean Pact, it has been suggested that the requirements for proving RBPs within the definitions provided in Decision 285, as well as the lack of enforcement power of the Andean Board, explain why Andean Pact competition legislation and case law have not developed as fast as that of member countries.[51] Consideration is now being given to the amendment of Decision 285 **and the establishment of new Rules for the Promotion and Protection of Competition.**

35. To realize the potential of regional groupings in this respect, therefore, some reflection would be appropriate as to which substantive competition regimes, institutional structures and mechanisms would promote cooperation. For this purpose, consultations might be undertaken within UNCTAD on how to maximize utilization of regional frameworks for enforcement cooperation. This would be in line with the Set of Principles and Rules, which provides for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms at the regional and subregional levels to promote the exchange of information on RBPs and on the application of national laws and policies in this area, * **as well as** to provide mutual assistance in RBP control (article E.7). The framework established under the Set might also be used more directly to further enforcement cooperation. So far, the consultation mechanisms provided for in the Set have mostly been used, with success, for presentations, the exchange of experiences and discussions on different competition issues. In one case in the mid-1980s, a developing country, using the UNCTAD secretariat as an intermediary, requested consultations with a developed country regarding the prohibition by one of its pharmaceutical firms of exports from a neighbouring developing country of pharmaceuticals manufactured under a licence granted by the firm. The matter was referred by the authorities of the developed country to the firm in question and its reply explaining the circumstances of the prohibition was transmitted to the developing country (the matter was brought to the attention of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices during informal consultations). It might be worth exploring the potential for further case-specific consultations of this type, which might be stimulated by a practice of notification of enforcement activities affecting the important interests of other States party to the Set to the States concerned. The aim would be to reinforce or promote cooperation under bilateral or regional agreements, rather than to replace such cooperation, since enforcement cooperation under non-binding OECD instruments tends to be less intensive and case-oriented if not backed-up by a binding bilateral agreement.[52]

36. Such case-specific enforcement cooperation would not come at the expense of other forms of cooperation, but would rather aim to link with and build on them in a synergistic manner. There are extensive contacts among competition authorities for the purpose of exchanging general information, experiences or ideas; such contacts take place either on an informal basis or in pursuance of bilateral or regional agreements, as well as under the Set of Principles and Rules and under OECD instruments.[53] Substantial technical assistance also takes place, in the form of: seminars and training courses; visits to, or training attachments with, competition authorities in developed countries; short-term missions to countries needing cooperation, including analyses of their situation and needs, workshops, group training, assistance on particular issues or in the drafting of legislation; and long-term secondments of personnel from authorities with experience in this area for the purposes of training and giving advice to the authorities of countries with limited experience. The European Commission, for example, has arranged study visits and responded to numerous requests for information from several competition authorities. * **It** has **also** assisted * **with** the preparation of a compendium of Latin American competition laws, a list of national authorities, the joint publication of a Latin American competition bulletin (posted on the Internet), a list of the technical cooperation needs of many Latin American countries and subregional organizations and a proposed biennial programme of technical assistance for MERCOSUR that includes a section on competition.[54] To the extent that the communication of experiences or provision of technical assistance by one or more countries induces other countries to adopt or amend competition legislation or modify enforcement policies or procedures along similar lines, this promotes "soft" convergence (in

contrast to the varying degrees of convergence or harmonization provided for in this area by free trade, customs union or common market agreements). It has been suggested that "one advantage of convergence by learning and imitation is its flexibility; if a particular approach does not work out in the circumstances of a country's economic system, it can be modified or even abandoned".[55]

37. Yet, as indicated above, some degree of commonality is necessary in this area for enforcement cooperation to be successful. * There is **also** a risk * of * lack of coherence among national competition regimes and between national and different levels of regional competition regimes. A study on CEMAC, for instance, highlights such impediments to the implementation of a regional competition policy as the inadequate implementation of competition laws at the national level (in those member countries which have such laws) and the lack of compatibility between the objectives of these laws and the proposed regional regulation on competition policy.[56] * **The study** therefore suggests the establishment within the CEMAC secretariat of a special * **consultative** mechanism to manage the transition to the entry into force of the regulation, to eventually be replaced by a regional competition board. * **This competition board** would focus on investigating and analysing those RBPs which hamper the development of trade within the subregion (in the transport sector for instance). It also recommends that efforts should be made to ensure compatibility between the proposed CEMAC regulations and national sectoral policies (including structural adjustment policies agreed upon with international financial institutions), the uniform act to be adopted under the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (some of the member States of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa are signatories of CEMAC) and the provisions of the treaty to replace the Lomé Convention. Regarding these recommendations, it might be noted that *, within the European Union itself, some countries have maintained national competition regimes significantly different from that of the European Union (Italy, for instance, did not even have a competition law until 1990), although the trend is toward convergence. Nevertheless, as indicated in chapter I, there is no hard and fast line between practices affecting individual countries and those affecting a region. * **As such**, it may not be easy for ACP countries which have little experience in this area to maintain separate regimes for national, subregional and interregional transactions, nor might this be conducive to trade or direct foreign investment.

38. Thus, it may be appropriate to undertake consultations within UNCTAD on how to ensure compatibility, coexistence and mutual reinforcement among national, subregional and interregional competition regimes. This would involve discussing how much convergence among substantive, procedural and enforcement policy aspects of competition laws and policies is necessary to further enforcement cooperation. * **Discussions might also be held on** * the appropriate balance would be between promoting such convergence and allowing room for diversity and experimentation by each country or subregional grouping to work out what is appropriate for its needs. It may be noted in this connection that the competition * **authority** of Gabon, which is a signatory to the CEMAC treaty, * **has** suggested that UNCTAD might help to ensure the conformity of the practices of regional and subregional States with competition principles. Such consultations could provide a useful input to the ongoing discussions or possible future negotiations within WTO on the interaction between trade and competition policy. It * **should** also be noted that a high-level advisory body has recommended that the United States explore the scope for collaboration among interested Governments and international organizations to create a new forum (called the "Global Competition Initiative") for

fostering dialogue directed toward greater convergence of competition law and analysis, common understandings and common culture.[57] **Support for this idea has been expressed by high officials of the United States federal competition authorities and of the European Commission - it has been suggested that such a Global Competition Forum might begin as a joint working group comprised of interested jurisdictions and international bodies already thinking about these issues (including UNCTAD), as well as interest groupings (representing industry, consumers, lawyers and academia), and should aim at improving coordination among competition authorities, setting standards and forging a world-wide consensus about competition policy issues, while assisting authorities which are new to this area.** [58]

39. The Fourth Review Conference has called upon States (see para. 5 of its resolution) to increase cooperation at all levels between competition authorities and Governments in order to strengthen effective action in the field of merger control and against cartels as covered by the Set, especially when these occur at the international level. It has noted (see para. 6) that, while, bilateral competition cooperation efforts are essential, there is a need to promote regional as well as multilateral competition initiatives, particularly for smaller and developing economies. It has requested the UNCTAD secretariat to study the possibility of formulating a model cooperation agreement on competition law and policy, based on the Set of Principles and Rules. It has further requested (see para. 9) the secretariat to take stock of anti-competitive cases with effects in more than one country, as well as the problems encountered in investigating the cases, in order to study the degree of efficiency of cooperation between competition authorities and Governments in solving them. It has decided (see paras. 15) that, in the light of the UNCTAD X Plan of Action (TD/386) as it relates to competition issues, the IGE should draw up its work plan along certain lines. In this connection, it resolved that UNCTAD should continue to study the issues of competition, competitiveness and development, with particular emphasis on, among other things, merger control issues, including the process of privatization and the implications of competition policy for small and micro economies and the opportunities for regional integration schemes in this field (see, respectively, paras. 18 (a) and (c)). It has also resolved (see para. 19) that UNCTAD should continue to pursue inputs to deliberations on possible international agreements on competition, including with respect to: exploring the effectiveness and complementarity of cooperation at bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels; clarifying the ways in which possible international agreements on competition might apply to developing countries, including through preferential or differential treatment, with a view to enabling them to introduce and enforce competition law and policy; and studying the roles of possible dispute mediation mechanisms and alternative arrangements, including voluntary peer reviews, in competition law and policy. The Fourth Review Conference decided (see para. 8) that the IGE at its current session should consider, for the better implementation of the Set and in relation to the studies prepared by the secretariat, cooperation regarding merger control. The importance of the Review Conference's resolution and of UNCTAD's work in this area has been highlighted by General Assembly resolution 55/182 of 20 December 2000, which reaffirms the role of competition law and policy for sound economic development, taking note of the important and useful work of UNCTAD in this field.

40. Accordingly, the Group of Experts may wish to provide some indications as to how the implementation of those paragraphs of the Fourth Review Conference's resolution dealing with international cooperation could be appropriately structured and sequenced, taking into account the findings and recommendations of the present report and developments relating to or within other forums. One suggestion put forth in exploring the effectiveness and complementarity of different forms or levels of international cooperation in this area, UNCTAD might adopt a "bottom-up" approach, giving priority to the examination of: (a) provisions contained in relevant OECD recommendations or bilateral cooperation agreements which might be included in a model (or models) of cooperation agreements; (b) on a comparative basis, the rules and procedures applicable to cooperation on competition law and policy within the framework of free trade, partnership, common market or single market agreements; (c) how such cooperation provisions in all these types of agreements would work in hypothetical cases, particularly those involving mergers or cartels of an international character, with the aim of eventually facilitating consultations upon real cases; and (d) how the principle of preferential or differential treatment for developing countries might be reflected in this context. [59] **This article further suggests that such an examination would prepare the ground for a subsequent assessment of the possible implications that might be drawn for a balanced multilateral regime in this area and how diversity and compatibility/convergence among national, bilateral, regional and multilateral regimes might be catered for or reconciled in peer reviews, mediation, or alternative arrangements.**

Notes

[1] **A preliminary report on this subject had been submitted to the first session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, held from 29 to 31 July 1998.**

[2] **See para. 7 of the resolution adopted by the Review Conference in UNCTAD, *Report of the Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices* (TD/RBP/CONF.5/16), chapter 1. Written comments on the question of international cooperation on competition law and policy have been received from the Governments of * Fiji, Madagascar, Malta, People's Republic of China, Peru, Poland, Romania and Thailand.**

[3] See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney-General and Assistant Attorney-General for Antitrust, "Final Report", United States Department of Justice, 2000, **(ICPAC Report)**.

[4] This categorization follows to some extent that adopted in World Trade Organization, *Annual Report 1997*, vol. 1, *Special Topic: Trade and Competition Policy*.

[5] See Price Waterhouse Fidafrica, *Le nouveau droit des affaires en Afrique - OHADA*, Paris, 1997.

[6] **See J. Musonda, "Regional competition policy for COMESA countries and implications for an FTA in 2000", in UNCTAD, *Competition policy, trade and development in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa* (UNCTAD/ITCD/CLP/Misc.18), p. 103.**

[7] **The phrase in the previous version of the report ".. the agreement also abolishes the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties between the parties after a transitional period" has been deleted at the request of the Canadian Competition Bureau.**

[8] See "FTC and DOJ publish communiqué from first "Antitrust summit of the Americas", *Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report*, 8 October 1998, vol. 75, p. 416.

[9] See WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition, "Policy report on the meeting of 11-13 March 1998" (WT/WGTCP/M/4), paragraph 57.

[10] "The scope, coverage and enforcement of competition laws and policies and analysis of the provisions of the Uruguay Round agreements relevant to competition policy, including their implications for developing and other countries" (TD/RBP/COM.2/EM/2). See also the WTO *Annual Report 1997*, op. cit.

[11] Now incorporated in GATT 1994.

[12] See OECD, "History and potential benefits of positive comity" (DAFFE/CLP/WP3(98)3).

[13] See H. Spier and T. Grimwalde, "International engagement in competition law enforcement: the future for Australia", *Trade Practices Law Journal* 5 (1997), p. 232.

[14] See WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Submission from the United States" (WT/WGTCP/W/48).

[15] See Commission of the European Communities, "Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws - 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1997", Brussels, 11 May 1998.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Reported in UNCTAD, "Restrictive business practices that have an effect in more than one country, in particular developing and other countries, with overall conclusions regarding the issues raised by these cases" (TD/RBP/CONF.4/6).

[18] See WT/WGTCP/W/48, op. cit.

[19] See also "Consorzio del Prosciutto de San Daniele - Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parmi"

(Rif. 1138, Delibera del 19.06.96 - Boll. N. 25/1996) (production quotas maintained by Parma ham producers in Italy; the Federal Trade Commission deferred enforcement action to the Italian competition authority).

[20] **See E. M. Armani, "Sabre contre Amadeus e.a.: un dossier riche en enseignements", in *Competition Policy Newsletter*, 2000, no. 3, p. 27.**

[21] See "Klein, Pitofsky, business leaders brief senators on pitfalls of foreign enforcement", *Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report* 75, 8 October 1998, p. 417.

[22] See "FTC Chairman discusses competition policy trends in international antitrust enforcement", *Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report* 75, 12 November 1998, p. 555.

[23] See *Ahlstrom et al. v. European Commission* (1988) ECR 5193 (1988) 4 C.M.L.R. 901, and WT/WGTCP/W/48, op. cit.

[24] See TD/B/COM.2/EM/2, op. cit.

[25] See M. Bloom, "International cooperation between competition authorities", speech to the Law Society's Solicitors' European Group Annual Conference, Bristol, 13 June 1997, p. 5, cited in OECD, op. cit.

[26] See OECD, "Trade and Competition Policies - Exploring the Ways Forward", p. 19.

[27] See German Monopolies Commission, *The Twelfth Biennial Report 1996/1997: Opening up Markets Extensively*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1998.

[28] Ibid.

[29] See "A note of caution with respect to a WTO agenda on competition policy", address by Joel L. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney-General, United States Department of Justice, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 18 November 1996.

[30] See UNCTAD, "The basic objectives and main provisions of competition laws and policies" (UNCTAD/ITD/15) and TD/B/COM.2/EM/2, op. cit.

[31] **See OECD, *Hard Core Cartels*, 2000.**

[32] See WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Communication from the United States - The impact of regulatory practices, State monopolies, and exclusive rights on competition and international trade" (WT/WGTCP/W/83).

[33] Ibid.

[34] "Japan - Measures affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper" (WT/DS44/R, 31 March 1998).

[35] See OECD, *Competition Policy and International Trade: Instruments of Cooperation*, Paris, 1987.

[36] See A. Schaub, "International cooperation in antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceedings", *EC Competition Policy Newsletter*, No. 1 (1998), p. 2.

[37] See Schaub, op. cit.

[38] See statements by the representatives of Brazil, Canada and the United States in WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Report on the meeting of 11-13 March 1998" (WT/WGTCP/M/74, paras. 41, 54 and 55).

[39] See Spier and Grimwalde, op. cit.

[40] See the statement by the representative of Brazil in paragraph 55 of WT/WGTCP/M/74, op. cit.

[41] See WTO, "Report (1999) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council" (WT/WGTCP/3), para. 44.

[42] Reported in TD/RBP/CONF.4/6, op. cit.

[43] See Y. Kenfack, "La politique de la concurrence dans les transports maritimes internationaux: enjeux pour les pays en développement", study prepared for the UNCTAD secretariat.

[44] See TD/RBP/CONF.4/6, op. cit.

[45] Information provided by the Kenyan competition authority.

[46] Ibid.

[47] See "A note of caution with respect to a WTO agenda on competition policy", address by Joel L. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney-General, United States Department of Justice, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 18 November 1996.

[48] Communication by the Mexican authorities to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD. See also WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Report of the meeting of 27 and 28 November 1997" (WT/WGTCP/M/3, statement of the representative of Mexico in paragraph 65).

[49] See G. Castañeda, "Mexico: competition policy and economic integration in NAFTA and MERCOSUR", *International Business Lawyer* 26 (1998), p. 496; * J. Tavares de Araujo and L.

Tineo, "Harmonization of competition policies among MERCOSUR countries", *The Antitrust Bulletin* XLIII (1998), p. 45; **and G. Oliveira, "Aspects of competition policy in MERCOSUR", *Boletin Latinoamericano de Competencia*, No. 11, December 2000, p. 37.**

[50] See the statement by the representative of Argentina in paragraph 53 of WT/WGTCP/M/4, op. cit.

[51] See B. Ciuffetelli, "Role of antitrust law in Latin American integration", *International Business Lawyer* 26 (1998), p. 522.

[52] See Schaub, op. cit.

[53] For information on the intensive exchanges taking place within the OECD, see WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Communication from OECD" (WT/WGTCP/W/21).

[54] See European Commission, *XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997*, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1998.

[55] WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, "Report on the meeting of 11-13 March 1998" (WT/WGTCP/M/4), paragraph 52.

[56] See Y. Kenfack, "Réglementation communautaire de la concurrence et renforcement du processus d'intégration économique en Afrique Centrale", *** (UNCTAD/ITCD/CLP/Misc.15), Consultant report** prepared for the UNCTAD secretariat.

[57] **See ICPAC Report, op. cit.**

[58] **See Joel I. Klein, "Time for a Global Competition Initiative?", Speech delivered at the EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 14 September 2000; and Mario Monti, "The International Dimension of Competition Enforcement", *Boletín Latinoamericano de Competencia*, No. 11, December 2000, p. 79, containing remarks from a speech delivered to the International Bar Association Conference on Competition Law, Fiesole, Italy, 27 October 2000.**

[59] **See R. Dhanjee, "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices – an instrument of international law?" *Legal Issues of Economic Integration*, vol. 28, no.1 (2001), p. 71.**

ANNEX 1

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to Mutual Cooperation regarding Restrictive Business Practices (Bonn, 23 June 1976).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters (Washington, D.C., 29 June 1982).

Agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic concerning Cooperation on Restrictive Business Practices (28 May 1984).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities on the Application of Their Competition Laws **(Washington, D.C.,** 23 September 1991; entry into force, 10 April 1995).

Cooperation and Coordination Agreement between the Australian Trade Practices Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission (July 1994).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada regarding the Application of their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws (Washington, D.C., 1 August 1995 and Ottawa, 3 August 1995).

Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Countering Unfair Competition and Antimonopoly, (25 April 1996).

Cooperation and Coordination Arrangement between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office and the Australian Commerce and Industry Office regarding the Application of their Competition and Fair Trading Laws, (Taipei, 13 September 1996).

Agreement between the United States of America and Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement (1997).

Cooperation and Coordination Arrangement between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office and the New Zealand Commerce and Industry Office regarding the Application of their Competition and Fair Trading Laws, (Taipei, 18 December 1997).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws **(Brussels and Washington, D.C,** 4 June 1998).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the State of Israel, regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, (Washington, 15 March 1999).

Canada-European Communities Agreement Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws (29 April 1999).

Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities **(Washington, D.C.,** 7 October 1999).

Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Cooperation in the Field of Countering Unfair Competition and Antimonopoly, (1999).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan regarding Cooperation on Anti-competitive activities, (Washington, D.C., 7 October 1999).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil regarding Cooperation between their Competition Authorities in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, **(Washington, D.C., 26 October 1999)**.

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, (Bonn, 17 June 2000).

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States regarding the application of their competition laws, (Mexico City, 11 September 2000).

Cooperation Arrangement between the Commissioner of Competition (Canada) the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission Regarding the Application of their Competition and Consumer Laws, (Wellington, October 2000).

Agreement between Denmark, Iceland and Norway regarding cooperation in competition cases, (Copenhagen, 16 March 2001).

ANNEX 2

SELECTED FREE TRADE, CUSTOMS UNION OR COMMON MARKET AGREEMENTS WITH COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY PROVISIONS

Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951).

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957).

Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association (Stockholm, 4 January 1960).

Association Agreement between the European Economic Community and Turkey (1961), with Decision No. 1/95 of the European Union-Turkey Association Council on Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs Union (22 December 1995).

Treaty Establishing the Central African Customs and Economic Union (Brazzaville, December 1964).

Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena, 26 May 1969), together with Decision 285 of the Andean Commission, "Norms to prevent or correct competitive distortions caused by practices that restrict free competition" (21 March 1991).

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Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement (entry into force, 1 January 1983), with the Protocol on the Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods (1988; entry into force, 1 July 1990), and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of Australia on Harmonization of Business Law (1 July 1988).

Southern Agreement Common Market (Asunción, 26 March 1991), together with Decision 17/96 containing the Protocol on the Defence of Competition (17 December 1996).

Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community (Windhoek, 17 August 1992), together with the Protocol on Trade (August 1996).

North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of Mexico (Washington, D.C., 8 and 17 December 1992; Ottawa, 11 and 17 December 1992; and Mexico City, 14 and 17 December 1992).

Central European Free Trade Agreement (entry into force, 1 March 1993).

Commonwealth of Independent States Treaty on Economic Union (Moscow, 24 September 1993).

Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (Port Louis, 17 October 1993).

Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Kampala, 5 November 1993).

Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their member States and the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden (13 December 1993; entry into force, 1 January 1994).

Treaty Establishing the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (N'Djamena, 16 March 1994).

Europe agreements between the European Communities and their member States, of the one part and **of the other part** respectively: the Republics of Hungary and Poland, * (Brussels, 16 December 1991; entry into force, 1 February 1994); the Republics of Bulgaria and Romania (entry into force, 1 February 1995); the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (12 June 1995); and Slovakia and Slovenia (15 June 1995);

Europe agreements establishing an association between the European Communities and their member States, of the one part and **of the other part** respectively, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Romania (entry into force, 1 February 1995).

Agreements on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part and **of the other part** respectively: the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (12 June 1995); and the Republics of Slovakia and Slovenia (15 June 1995).

Agreements on partnership and cooperation between the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Committee, of the one part and **of the other part** respectively: Ukraine (14 June 1994); the Russian Federation (24 June 1994); the Republic of Kazakhstan (23 January 1995); the Kyrgyz Republic (9 February 1995); the Republic of Moldova (28 November 1994); and the Republic of Belarus (6 March 1995).

Osaka Action Agenda, 1995, adopted by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).

Euro-Mediterranean agreements establishing an association between the European Communities and their member States, of the one part and **of the other part** respectively: the State of Israel (Brussels, 22 November 1995); the Kingdom of Morocco (30 January 1996); the Republic of Tunisia (17 July 1996); the Palestinian Authority (2 June 1997); and Jordan (24 November 1997).

Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Community and its Member States, adopted at Cotonou, Benin, on 23 June 2000. **(Not yet entered into force).**

Framework cooperation agreement leading ultimately to the establishment of a political and economic association between the European Community and its member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part (Florence, 21 June 1996).

Canada/Chile Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa, 14 November 1996; entry into force, 1 June 1997).

Protocol VIII on Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, Dumping and Subsidies, amending the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (Chaguaramas, 4 July 1973; entry into force, 1 August 1973, opened for signature on 14 March 2000, not yet entered into force).

ANNEX 3

MULTILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL INSTRUMENTS DEALING WITH COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

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Recommendation of the OECD Council on restrictive business practices affecting international trade, including those involving multinational corporations (20 July 1978).

The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, adopted by General Assembly resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980.

Recommendation of the OECD Council for cooperation between member countries in areas of potential conflict between competition and trade polices (C(86)65(Final), 23 October 1986).

Recommendation of the OECD Council, "minimizing conflicting requirements: approaches of moderation and restraint" (1987).

Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Marrakech, April 1994).

Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between member countries on anti-competitive practices affecting international trade (27 and 28 July 1995 (C(95)130/FINAL)).

Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning effective action against hard-core cartels.

WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services (15 February 1997; entry into force, 1 January 1998).

OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, adopted by the Governments of the 29 Member countries of the OECD and of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Slovakia at the OECD Ministerial Meeting on 27 June 2000.